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tory certainty given the risk, and often long-time horizons, of their
investments.
New on-orbit space activities, such as asteroid mining, satellite
servicing, debris removal, and lunar habitats and research facilities,
currently fall within a regulatory gap—the Executive Branch lacks
express Congressional delegation to regulate such activities. This
situation may appear to be a victory for proponents of a nearly
pure or unadulterated version of permissionless innovation. Indeed, to protect the status quo, permissionless innovation advocates are ignoring long-established and agreed upon rules of treaty
interpretation to argue that the U.S. government is not under an
obligation to authorize and supervise U.S. commercial space companies’ activities.
The irony is that the current gap actually undermines the benefits of permissionless innovation. The Executive Branch faces a
Hobbesian choice of following Congressional intent and standing
aside as new on-orbit activities are engaged in or complying with
international obligations and addressing potential national security
concerns by continuing to leverage existing authorities in an attempt to reach on-orbit activities. U.S. commercial space businesses—the innovators—are left in a similarly difficult situation: facing
a risk of foreign government retaliation in the event of the U.S.
government’s non-compliance with international obligations, or
being forced to engage in costly and time-consuming litigation if
the U.S. government blocks their proposed activity by stretching
existing authorities. Fortunately, the U.S. Congress can enact a solution that fills the gap—providing compliance with international
obligations, protection of national security, and regulatory certainty for U.S. space businesses—and at the same time ensure that
permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de corps control the
interagency approval process, including a default presumption in
favor of approval.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A permissionless innovation regulatory model is credited with
growing the Internet. This model allows new technologies to be
developed and deployed without government permission, or as little permission as possible.1 Recently, for the first time, policymakers are raising the question of whether a permissionless innovation regulatory model is possible in the increasingly commercialized outer space domain, particularly for new activities, and if so,
what would it look like and what would its limits be. As House
Science Committee Space Subcommittee Chairman Brian Babin
stated recently:
[T]his question of how we will regulate our private sector
activities is not simply academic. I believe it is one of the
fundamental space policy questions of our time. America is
great because it is a country where you have the freedom to
create without government permission. We are all free, unless we chose, through our legislative process, to limit our
freedoms.2
Of course, permissionless innovation is rarely pure in the sense
of being an argument for no regulation. Rather, it is a way of
thinking that runs counter to the precautionary principle3—a principle that promotes regulation to protect from harms not yet proven or identified.
While permissionless innovation has framed regulatory debates in the cyber and telecommunications arena for decades, its
transition to the space domain is recent—driven by viable new

1 See generally ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING
CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM (2016) (arguing for a public
policy allowing for permissionless innovation in the modern tech industry).
2 See Brian Babin, Chairman, Space Comm. of the H. Sci. Comm., Remarks to
FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference, 16-17 (Feb. 7, 2017), transcript
available
at
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/CBB-speech-to-FAA-conference-Feb-7-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7H4S-VJUJ] (stating that the space sector is not unique in this
respect as the same questions are being raised with respect to a whole host of new
technologies and their associated business models, including autonomous
vehicles, the sharing economy, robots, and 3D printing, among others).
3 Thierer, supra note 1.
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business models and technologies that will expand commercial activities in the space domain. New space activities beyond the traditional satellite communications and remote sensing markets are
drawing significant investment and displaying rapid technological
development. These new space businesses are engaged in the pursuit of commercial human space flight,4 space resource mining,5
commercial habitats in-orbit and on the Moon,6 lunar rovers,7 and
on-orbit servicing of satellites,8 including refueling and repairs.
However, technology and business model innovation is also
occurring in traditional sectors of the space economy, including
launch, remote sensing, and communications sectors. Reusable
booster rocket systems are on the way, with multiple companies
successfully landing first stages, and one even contracting to reuse
a first stage for a satellite launch.9 Similarly disruptive, several
companies are developing new, low-cost launch vehicles for small
satellites.10 Ever-improving technologies are leading to higher res-

4 See,
e.g.,
VIRGIN
GALACTIC,
http://www.virgingalactic.com/
[https://perma.cc/GT62-VFMW] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (proposing tourismsupported spaceflight); see also BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/
[https://perma.cc/XZ4V-7C2P] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (proposing technology
for commercial spaceflight).
5 See,
e.g., PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5U-MSSU] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (presenting itself as
the future leading provider of resources in space); DEEP SPACE IND., INC.,
http://deepspaceindustries.com/ [https://perma.cc/L9EB-EHNG] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2017) (introducing asteroid mining and its impact on the space economy).
6 See,
e.g., BIGELOW AEROSPACE, http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/
[https://perma.cc/S5XQ-K9RC] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (calling for the
building of new types of space station).
7 See,
e.g.,
MOON
EXPRESS,
http://moonexpress.com/
[https://perma.cc/4TX5-SE37] (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (intending to use the
Moon’s resources for the benefit of humanity).
8 See, e.g., Juliet Van Wegenen, In-Orbit Services Experts See Bright Future,
SATELLITE
(Sept.
3,
2015),
Challenges,
VIA
http://www.satellitetoday.com/technology/2015/09/03/in-orbit-servicesexperts-see-bright-future-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/6A7U-JGP9] (describing
how in-orbit servicing of satellites is a critical part of space infrastructure).
9 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, SpaceX’s Reusable Falcon 9: What Are The Real
(Apr.
25,
2016),
Cost
Savings
For
Customers
?,
SPACENEWS
http://spacenews.com/spacexs-reusable-falcon-9-what-are-the-real-cost-savingsfor-customers [https://perma.cc/RE6F-3EVV] (announcing that SpaceX would be
the first, after NASA, to successfully reuse rocket hardware cost-effectively).
10 Doug Messier, Multiple Small Satellite Launch Vehicles Under Development,
ARC
(Sept.
23,
2015),
PARABOLIC
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/09/23/multiple-small-satellite-launchvehicles-development/ [https://perma.cc/65VB-WJBM] (declaring that at least
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olutions for remote sensing space systems.11 Small satellites are
now capable of more sophisticated imagery, and imaging companies offer big data analytics based on more continuous imagery.12
In communications, ideas for large Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations providing satellite internet are on the table and are at various stages of implementation by several companies.13 These new
constellations can lead to potential spectrum battles between more
traditional Geostationary Orbit (GEO) satellites and LEO satellites,
and among competing LEO systems. New developments in the
race to 5G terrestrial wireless also create spectrum competition (as
well as potential sharing models) with satellite systems,14 both
GEO and LEO. Collectively, all these developments and plans create predictions for large increases in the number of launches over
the next decade.15

twenty launch vehicles for small satellites are currently under development
around the world).
11 See Colin Clark, DigitalGlobe, Eager for Foreign Biz, Presses NOAA for Quarter
BREAKING
DEF.
(Aug.
23,
2013),
Meter
Resolution,
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/digitalglobe-hoping-for-foreign-bizpresses-noaa-for-quarter-meter-resolution/
[https://perma.cc/C9VS-GUKG]
(revealing that the digital satellite imagery industry, dominated by DigitalGlobe,
is adapting image resolution to the demands of the international market).
12 See, e.g., Kevin M. O’Connell, President and CEO, Innovative Analytics &
Training, LLC and Outgoing Chair of NOAA’s Federal ACCRES, Testimony
before H. Sci. Comm. Space Sub-Comm.: “Commercial Remote Sensing:
Facilitating Innovation and Leadership” (Sept. 7, 2016) (transcript available at
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents
/Kevin%20M.%20O%27Connell%20House%20Science%20Committee%20Testimo
ny%20Final.pdf) [https://perma.cc/W5U8-SRF8] (calling for the update of U.S.
policy and regulatory mechanisms to keep leadership in the space area).
13 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, The Return of Satellite Constellations, THE SPACE REV.
(Mar.
23,
2015),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2716/1
[https://perma.cc/9VXY-QNP7] (describing the effort by several competing
companies to create broadband communications services using space technology).
14 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, Satellite Sector Mulls How to Live with FCC’s 5G
Decision, SPACENEWS (July 22, 2016), http://spacenews.com/satellite-sector-mullshow-to-live-with-fccs-5g-decision/ [https://perma.cc/6SBY-7H78] (retelling the
reactions to the FCC’s ruling denying protected status to satellite systems that
have been investing in Ka-band spectrum).
15 See FAA, 2015 COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FORECASTS (Apr. 2015),
transcript
available
at
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Com
mercial_Space_Transportation_Forecasts_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7ETG37N] (discussing geosynchronous and non-geosynchronous orbit launch
demand forecast).
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In creating regulatory approaches for new activities, and examining existing regulatory approaches for traditional activities, the
question is whether the U.S. can adopt a permissionless innovation
regime and if so, what it would look like, and what its limits or
bounds would be. In answering these questions, one must realize
the unique nature of the outer space domain vis-à-vis the cyber
domain and appreciate the differences between activities in these
two domains. First, in the outer space domain, the U.S. is under an
international obligation to “authoriz[e]” and provide “continuing
supervision” for its non-governmental (commercial) space activities, and further is made “[internationally] responsib[le]” for such
activities.16 There is no such obligation in the cyber domain; indeed there are few international laws governing the cyber domain
at all.17 Second, everyday, non-illicit activities in the space domain,
and even the mere act of getting to outer space, more directly implicate national security concerns than everyday cyber activities.
Most activities in the cyber domain, except theft of national secrets
and trade secrets of the industrial complex, or interference with
critical infrastructure (or elections), do not implicate national security concerns. Third, the capital investment dynamics of the two
domains are different. Investment in space activities is not only
risky but many projects have incredibly long time-horizons to profitability. Space investors worry about regulatory risk if permissionless innovation models do not, at a minimum, create a stable,
transparent process that is consistent with U.S. international obligations and U.S. national security concerns. For all these reasons,
(nearly) pure versions of permissionless innovation would create
substantial risks for the growth and development of the U.S. commercial space industry.
Thus, maintaining the regulatory status quo featuring a gap in
the U.S. government regulatory authority over on-orbit space activities will defeat the purposes of permissionless innovation despite appearing to create a (nearly) pure form of permissionless innovation. The Congress made clear back in 1997 that it did not

16 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI,
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
17 See, e.g., Jason Healy & Hannan Pitts, Applying International Environmental
Legal Norms to Cyber Statecraft, I/S J. 356, 359-62 (2012) (noting “little” law
governing the technical approach to the internet and the lack of global adherence
to the Budapest Convention addressing criminal aspects of cyber security).
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wish to allocate regulatory authority over on-orbit activities (other
than remote sensing and spectrum use) to the Executive Branch.18
Yet, the Executive Branch is keenly aware of its international obligation to authorize and supervise such activities as well as the potential national security implications of such activities.19 The status
quo leaves a Hobbesian choice for the Executive Branch. When a
new activity is proposed, the Executive Branch can stand aside, fully yielding to Congressional intent, to the detriment of U.S. compliance with its international obligations and potential national security concerns. Alternatively, the Executive Branch can seek to
leverage its existing payload review authority to block or authorize
(depending on circumstances) post-payload deployment on-orbit
activities, ensuring compliance with U.S. international obligations
and protection of national security, but exceeding Congress’ delegation. For the industry, the innovators, the situation is no better.
They may engage in an activity that was not properly authorized
as required by U.S. international obligations and risk foreign actions that might block their markets or businesses from cooperating with the U.S. innovator. Alternatively, U.S. space businesses
may be forced to resort to litigation to challenge the U.S. Executive
Branch action. Litigation can consume valuable time and money
and is undertaken with the realization that the U.S. government is
a substantial customer of U.S. commercial space businesses. Fortunately, with some adjustments to current Executive Branch and
Congressional proposals for regulating new on-orbit activities, the
Hobbesian choice can be eliminated. Better still, permissionless innovation thinking can still pervade the U.S. regulatory approach to
such activities while complying with U.S. international obligations,
protecting U.S. national security, and providing adequate regulatory certainty for space industry investors.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the concept of permissionless
innovation, giving examples from the cyber domain that contain
potential lessons for the outer space domain. Section 3 discusses
the current status of permissionless innovation in the U.S. regulation of traditional activities in the space domain, looking at the ex-

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997).
See Letter from John Holdren, Dir. & Asst. to President for Sci. and Tech.,
to Sen. Thune and Rep. Smith (Apr. 4, 2016) (on file with author)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/csla
_report_4-4-16_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHL-VQHJ] (proposing legislation
to ensure compliance with OST Article VI).
18
19
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amples of launch, remote sensing, and communications licensing
regimes. Section 4 analyzes three key risks to pursuing a (nearly)
pure version of permissionless innovation in regulating new onorbit activities. Section 5 examines the three significant proposals
released in the past two years to fill the regulatory gap that exists
with respect to new on-orbit activities—one emerging from the
Obama Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) through an interagency process, one arising from a Congressman recently nominated to be the next NASA Administrator,
and one adopted by the U.S. House Science Committee. Section 6
proposes eight friendly amendments to the approaches on the table
that maximize permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de
corps while at the same time ensuring compliance with U.S. international obligations, protection of U.S. national security, and regulatory certainty for companies. It also recommends against two
other amendments or approaches that have been proposed by
(nearly) pure permissionless innovation advocates. Part 7 concludes.
2. THE ESSENCE OF PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION
Permissionless innovation as a concept evades exact definition
or categorization. Sometimes the term refers to avoiding private
permissions (e.g., from patent holders) as well as authorization
from the government. In this article, the concept will only be used
to refer to avoiding (or limiting) the need for government permission to develop and deploy technology.
One of the leading studies on permissionless innovation20
frames the discussion by contrasting it with precautionary principle thinking—that calls for regulation even in the absence of identifiable, provable harms. Importantly, it is a concept in which a
range of actual regulatory policy approaches can fit. Indeed, one
can view permissionless innovation regulatory approaches along a
continuum.21 A pure or unadulterated version of permissionless
innovation would mean that the development and deployment of
technology is subject to no regulation or government approvals

Thierer, supra note 1, at 1–3.
See id. at 105–107 (labeling permissionless innovation on a risk response
continuum).
20
21
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(i.e., ”you may develop and deploy the technology how you wish
and where you wish”). On the opposite end of the continuum
would be a hyper-precautionary principle (or anti-permissionless
innovation), involving a complete prohibition of the development
and deployment of technology (i.e., ”you may neither develop nor
deploy the technology anywhere at anytime”). We find few examples of technology regulation at the far ends of the continuum, although there are a few, such as prohibitions on certain genetic cloning on the one side. Some believe that the current U.S. approach to
new space activities, which is essentially a regulatory gap, comes
close to a pure permissionless innovation approach. However, the
situation is a bit more clouded in reality.
As a variety of regulatory approaches are plotted along the
continuum, it is important to view permissionless innovation as a
frame of mind or way of thinking. The way of thinking emphasizes the default should be to allow technology development and deployment in the absence of identified, serious harms.22 The essence
of permissionless innovation thinking can be detected not only
where permission is the policy default, but also by a variety of related factors, including where trust is placed in industry selfregulation, insurance markets, educate and empower solutions,
and the common law to solve legal problems. Where such solutions fail, targeted legal solutions are adopted after conducting a
“benefit-cost analysis.”23 One might add as corollaries that permission decisions, to the extent needed, will be timely, transparent,
and afford opportunities to cure defects found in initial proposals
or applications. Innovation is stifled by delays, hidden rationales
for decisions, and the inability to adjust proposed innovation to
public policy concerns.
Permissionless innovation debates historically and even today
are on display most prominently in the cyber domain. Three recent examples from the cyber domain contain possible lessons for
the new debate over permissionless innovation possibilities in the
outer space domain. First, use of the term in the cyber domain
22 See id. at 4 (discussing the risk response continuum wherein regulation of
technological development should be avoided in the absence of identified harms).
23 See Adam Thierer & Michael Wilt, Permissionless Innovation: A 10-Point
(Mar.
31,
2016),
Checklist
for
Public
Policymakers,
GEO. MASON
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/permissionless-innovation-10-pointchecklist-public-policymakers [https://perma.cc/UGD2-95RH] (eliminating some
factors on their list that are specifically or mostly geared towards the cyber
domain).
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helps one understand that a regulatory approach can fit within a
permissionless innovation framework even if it is not a pure version. For example, leading telecommunications companies assert
that so-called “Part 15 rules” (more specifically 47 C.F.R. Ch. 15
rules of the FCC governing unlicensed spectrum transmissions)
qualify as a permissionless innovation framework.24 But even here,
devices that rely on unlicensed spectrum to operate must meet
minimal standards so as not to interfere unnecessarily with other
devices or with Wi-Fi connections relying on the same unlicensed
spectrum. The recent complaint by large telecommunications
companies concerning LTE-U devices that use the unlicensed spectrum is that meeting existing Part 15 criteria may no longer be sufficient and that they may now have to go through additional interference testing, creating in their words a “Mother-may-I”
situation.25 The worry of the major telecommunications operators
interested in LTE-U is that the Wi-Fi Alliance, a proponent of additional interference testing, is moving the pre-existing point of regulation too far along the continuum to qualify as permissionless innovation anymore.
Second, use of the concept in the cyber domain by competing
industries or industries at different levels within the network may
be illuminating in several contexts in the space domain, including
the traditional satellite communications market and potentially
new activities such as asteroid or lunar mining. Permissionless innovation, in part due to its somewhat malleable character with no
single defining test, is used as a rhetorical tool by parties on both
sides of the “net neutrality” debate. “Net neutrality” posits that internet service providers (ISPs) should not be able to discriminate
against certain types of traffic over others.26 Application creators
and large-bandwidth using video providers argue that their innovation will be stifled if ISPs can slow their traffic or charge excessive fees for transmitting such traffic. ISPs argue that their innovation, in both technology and pricing/business model structures,
24 See Joan Marsh, A Return to Permissionless Innovation, AT&T (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.attpublicpolicy.com/wi-fi/a-return-to-permission-less-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/9DRN-6SQ7] (demonstrating that AT&T identifies unlicensed
spectrum FCC Part 15 rules as fitting within the permissionless innovation
framework).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old, Something
New, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665 (2015) (arguing against open internet rules and for
handling violations of net neutrality on a case-by-case basis).
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will be hindered if the government prevents them from fully considering different bandwidth demands of different applications on
their networks. The net neutrality or Open Internet Order adopted
by the FCC in 201527 that sought a middle road and still allows for
“reasonable” traffic management practices, leaves ISPs guessing if
their view of reasonableness ultimately comports with the FCC’s
view,28 and application creators wondering if their customers will
be blocked or slowed when utilizing their applications. The net
neutrality debate demonstrates that a regulatory approach can, in
essence, express a preference for one company’s or one industry’s
technological or business case innovation possibilities over another
or, alternatively, can strike a clouded middle ground potentially
harming innovation in several companies or industries.
Third, use of the permissionless innovation concept in the approach of some Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners in
the cyber realm allows one to think about several important distinctions in regulatory approaches and their impact on permissionless innovation thinking: distinguishing ex ante and ex post government interventions and substantive/generally applicable versus
procedural/case-by-case approaches to regulation. For example,
FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen believes the FTC approach to internet concerns such as privacy, fraud, and security is superior to the
FCC’s approach because of the FTC’s focus on ex post, case-by-case
enforcement to a greater degree than ex ante substantive regulation. As she describes it:
The FTC’s process is enforcement-centric rather than rulemaking-centric. As such, it is ex post rather than ex ante and
case-by-case rather than one-size-fits-all. Since an enforcement action requires a complaint and a case to move ahead,
the FTC’s method typically focuses on actual, or at least
specifically alleged, harms rather than attempt to predict
future harms more generally.

27 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15-24 (Feb. 26,
2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7RM-Y92T].
28 See Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, The FCC Threatens the Rule of Law: A
Focus on Agency Enforcement and Merger Review Abuses, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y L. REV.
54, 55 (2016) (discussing the FCC’s catch-all standard of reasonableness which
states “that an internet service provider ‘shall not unreasonably interfere with or
unreasonably disadvantage’ end users or edge content or application providers”).
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Because of these structural differences, the FTC’s enforcement process is less affected by the systemic knowledge
problems of the FCC’s prescriptive ex ante rulemaking approach. . .
Thus, the FTC’s approach facilitates . . . “permissionless innovation,” . . . better than a prescriptive rulemaking approach. The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. As the
Internet—the most dynamic technological environment in
history—has become an increasingly integral part of society, the FTC’s enforcement-centric approach has enabled it
to protect consumers and competition online even while
industry has continued to innovate. In fact, the FTC is already addressing major Internet-centric concerns, including
new issues in privacy, fraud, advertising and other consumer protection issues, along with competition issues.29
The regulation of space activities in a permissionless innovation manner needs to be distinguished from what Commissioner
Ohlhausen sees in FTC regulation of the cyber domain. Regulation
of space activities in contrast to cyber activities does not involve
the full expanse of every industry. True, there are a variety of industries in the space sector, but they are not nearly as expansive as
all those industries active in the cyber domain. Additionally, in
looking at space activities, the greater possibility of national security harms from every-day, non-illicit activities dictate advanced
consideration of an activity’s impact. Indeed, what currently exists
for traditional space activities (launch, remote sensing, communications) are licensing regimes in which the applicant provides information that is reviewed for its potential impact on national security and a limited number of other factors. In other words,
regulation of traditional activities in space involves most prominently an ex ante, case-by-case analysis, and the industry specific
expertise of regulators as well as national security concerns justifies
the ex ante approach in the space domain. National security harms
outweigh all other harms—and provide the easiest justification for
ex ante examination. The case for ex ante examination of space activities is further buttressed by U.S. international obligations requiring authorization—official permission in advance according to

Maureen Ohlhausen, The Procrustean Problem with Prescriptive Regulation, 23
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 7 (2014)
29
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the ordinary meaning of that term—of space activities engaged in
by U.S. commercial companies. A leading permissionless innovation study places “anticipatory regulation” to include “licensing
and permits” closer to precautionary principle thinking than permissionless innovation thinking.30 However, where the license applications are subject to a narrow review and benefit from default
presumption of approval, and where decisions are timely, transparent, and appealable, and also incorporate at least one private or
market mechanism, such as giving deference to industry standards, it is hard to see why such a “light touch” approach does not
fall within the permissionless innovation thinking end of the continuum.
A more detailed examination of the current licensing regimes
in place for traditional activities– launches, remote sensing and
spectrum usage by communications satellites—follows below.
3. EXISTING U.S. REGULATION OF TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES:
LAUNCH, REMOTE SENSING, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Practically speaking, the United States government is aware of
every American space asset launched, as Congress requires all
launches to be licensed by the FAA, with a payload review as part
of that process,31 and all radio frequency used by satellites for
communication with Earth must be licensed by the FCC.32 Congress imposes an additional layer of licensing on all commercial
remote sensing space systems,33 an obligation interpreted in the
past several years to include any satellite capable of sensing the
Earth in the broadest sense instead of only those that intend to image the planet’s surface. This interpretation was adopted due to
concerns over the national security implications of satellites that
could take imagery of valuable military and diplomatic installments and personnel.
Thus, Congress has expressly allocated licensing authority for
spectrum usage and remote sensing, but not for other on-orbit activities. New on-orbit activities currently sit in a regulatory

30
31
32
33

Thierer, supra note 1, at 105–07.
51 U.S.C. §§ 50903–04 (2012).
47 U.S.C. §§ 701–69 (2012).
51 U.S.C. § 60101 (2012); 15 C.F.R. pt. 960 (2016).
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“gap.”34 Indeed, the legislative history of amendments to the 1998
Commercial Space Launch Act indicates that Congress did not intend to allocate licensing authority to the FAA for on-orbit activities.35 Outside of spectrum use and remote sensing licensure, currently no Executive agency maintains clearly delineated authority
to license or regulate on-orbit activities.36 For new space activities
like asteroid mining, on-orbit servicing of satellites, space debris
remediation, space hotels, and private research labs in space, the
existing National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) and FCC licensing regimes are insufficient in some
instances to guarantee American compliance with the provisions of
Art. VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OST). The OST is the seminal
treaty addressing outer space activities that has over 100 countries
party to it, including all major space powers.37
In contrast to other activities, the lack of on-orbit or in-space licensing authority likely does not impact sub-orbital flights because
one might say the launch and reentry of such vehicles are relatively
seamless—with tourists enjoying 5-10 minutes of weightlessness.
Indeed, the regulations actually define “launch” of a reusable
launch vehicle for sub-orbital flight as only ending when the vehicle touches down.38 Thus, the launch license already covers the entire activity. In essence, at least from a regulatory perspective,
there is no on-orbit or in-space activity or reentry in such a case.
Congress has legislated an elaborate scheme governing human
space flight applicable to both sub-orbital and orbital flights.
While commercial human space flight is nascent with no paid
flights in the sub-orbital domain yet having taken place and only
34 See Michael Gold, Statement at the House Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing
on “FAA Oversight of Commercial Space Transportation,” SPACEREF (June 22, 2016),
http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=49019
[https://perma.cc/22Z3EVB8] (noting that all other countries with national space laws have a single
national framework that is not divided into silos for specific activities); see also
Frans von der Dunk, Effective Exercise of ‘In-Space Jurisdiction’: The U.S. Approach
and the Problems it is Facing, 40 J. OF SPACE LAW (questioning if the broad structure
of space regulation effectively applies to the modern space industry, especially
within the United States).
35 H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997).
36 Holdren Letter, supra note 19.
37 UNCOPUOS, 55th Sess., Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2016/CRP.3 (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_201
6_CRP03E.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9KV-83JB].
38 51 U.S.C. § 50902 (2012); 14 C.F.R. § 401.5 (2016).
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eight commercial orbital flights to date, all involving flights aboard
Russia’s Soyuz craft to the ISS for a cost of roughly $20 million per
trip,39 due to its extensive existing regulation by the United States it
will be discussed along with the traditional activity of space
launch. But for the other new on-orbit space activities, there is ongoing debate whether the United States Executive Branch needs
legislation granting it new authority in order to meet its OST obligation to “authorize” and provide “continuing supervision” for its
nationals’ space activities.
3.1. Permissionless Innovation and FAA Launch (and Re-Entry)
Licensing & Regulation of Human Space Flight
Any space launch or re-entry requires an FAA license.40 This is
appropriate because orbital launch vehicles contain fuel that
weighs around twenty times that of the rocket itself, and the size of
re-entering first stages can equal that of six buses combined.41 In
other words, space launch vehicles are essentially ballistic missile
technology used for other purposes.42
In deciding whether to award a license, the FAA conducts a
policy review to determine whether there are any national security,
foreign policy, or international obligation concerns; a safety review
to assess any third party risk; a payload review;43 and an environ-

39 See Rich McCormick, Russia’s Space Agency Plans to Resume ISS Tourist
VERGE
(Mar.
24,
2015),
Flights
in
2018,
THE
http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/24/8286409/russias-space-agencyroscosmos-space-tourist-flight-2018 [https://perma.cc/8GP6-53JB] (discussing
that between 2001 and 2009, there were eight private trips made to the ISS).
40 See 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2013) (detailing the various restrictions on launches,
operations, and reentries).
41 See SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/falcon9 [https://perma.cc/RE6F3EVV] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (describing SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket as being 229
feet high and 12 feet wide).
42 See Karl Tate, How Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Work, SPACE (Feb. 1,
2013),
http://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missileswork-infographic.html
[https://perma.cc/49Q2-EQCT]
(explaining
how
modified intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) work and noting that they
were used by early Soviet and American manned orbital missions).
43 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 415.1 to .70 (2016) (prescribing requirements for obtaining a
license to launch a launch vehicle, other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV))
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mental review.44 Further, a launch licensee is financially responsible to a large degree for third-party damages. Namely, the launch
licensee must procure third-party liability insurance equivalent to
maximum probable loss (MPL) and insurance to cover any government liability, including damage to government property.45
Federal law also requires the launch operator to engage in a series
of cross-waivers of liability with its suppliers and contractors, its
customers, and its customers’ suppliers and contractors.46 Consequently, due to the federal cross-waiver regime, neither the companies nor the individuals involved in the manufacture, operation,
or purchase of launch services can sue one another for negligence
nor gross negligence should an accident occur.47
The FAA also conducts similar reviews for re-entry licenses.
This is no longer theoretical because an American company has
developed a launch vehicle in which the first stage—the largest
and most-expensive stage—of the rocket is reentered for ultimate

44 See id. §§ 415.201-.400 (providing FAA requirements for environmental
review).
45 Matthew Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International
Negotiations Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the U.S. Commercial
Space Industry, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 230–241 (2015) (“[T]he U.S. third-party
liability regime is broken into three tiers. First, the U.S. government requires . . .
that commercial space-flight operators obtain third-party liability insurance in the
amount of the maximum probable loss (MPL), according to a calculation
performed by the FAA . . . . Second, if third-party liability claims exceed the
[MPL], the government has in essence made a statutory promise to pay for the
next tier, or tranche, of up to $2.8 billion dollars in any third-party liability claims
faced by a space-flight entity. In the third tier, where third-party claims exceed the
MPL plus the amount of promised government indemnification, liability reverts
back to the operator.”); see 51 U.S.C. §§ 50914–50915 (2013) (listing liability
insurance and financial responsibility requirements, as well as U.S. government
paying claims exceeding liability insurance and financial responsibility
requirements of the licensee).
46 See 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b) (describing requirements relevant to reciprocal
waiver of claims); see also Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–48 (describing the liability
of Space Flight Participants (SFPs) under the Commercial Space Launch
Amendments Act of 2004).
47 Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–48.
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reuse.48 Moreover, another company has tested first stage reentry.49
Evidence suggests that launch licenses almost operate with a de
facto presumption of approval, and Congress has even established
a separate category of experimental permits to ensure that less well
tested vehicles can undergo testing and innovation.50 Additionally,
Congress recently made clear that a company can operate under
and maintain an experimental permit to continue testing improvements while also maintaining a launch license for the same
launch vehicle.51
While Congress has not put forth a legal presumption of approval, it has declared in numerous enactments the importance of
developing a vibrant commercial space launch capacity in the
United States.52 The U.S. government even went so far as to help
fund the development of new commercial space launch vehicles
through milestone payments for technological improvements using

48 See, e.g., Romain Dillet, SpaceX Successfully Lands its First Stage Falcon 9
TECH
CRUNCH
(Feb.
19,
2017),
Rocket
at
Cape
Canaveral,
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/19/spacex-successfully-lands-its-first-stagefalcon-9-rocket-at-cape-canaveral/ [https://perma.cc/9AQC-CL5D] (“SpaceX . . .
successfully landed the first stage of its Falcon 9 rocket at Cape Canaveral.”).
49 See Dominic Gates, Bezos Says Blue Origin Achieves ‘Holy Grail of Rocketry,’
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeingaerospace/jeff-bezoss-blue-origin-reaches-milestone-with-reusable-rocket/
[https://perma.cc/PKB4-S67V] (“Blue Origin space-travel company successfully
sent a rocket 62 miles up into space and then . . . landed it upright just four-and-ahalf feet from the center of its launchpad.”).
50 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 437.1–.17 (prescribing requirements for obtaining an
experimental permit and maintaining a permit).
51 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
§ 104, 129 Stat. 704, 706-07 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 51
U.S.C.).
52 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7)–(8) (2011) (“(7) the United States should encourage
private sector launches, reentries, and associated services and, only to the extent
necessary, regulate those launches, reentries, and services to ensure compliance
with international obligations of the United States and to protect the public health
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States; (8) space transportation, including the establishment and
operation of launch sites, reentry sites, and complementary facilities, the
providing of launch services and reentry services, the establishment of support
facilities, and the providing of support services, is an important element of the
transportation system of the United States, and in connection with the commerce
of the United States there is a need to develop a strong space transportation
infrastructure with significant private sector involvement.”).
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“other transaction authority” under NASA’s statutory authority.53
In fact, there are new media reports that Elon Musk, SpaceX’s
owner, is engaging in “permissionless innovation” through his development of reusable first stage boosters,54 although it bears mentioning that the claim may be due to a misunderstanding that
SpaceX’s reentry landings—first done on barges in the ocean—still
require FAA approval.
With respect to human space flight, federal law only requires
space operators to obtain informed consent from space flight participants (“SFPs”).55 Congress recently added SFPs to the full federal cross waiver through 2025, such that SFPs will not be able to
sue, at least for the next ten years, for personal injury or death unless resulting from intentional misconduct by the launch operator.56 This overcomes the problem that had developed wherein a
patchwork of state laws, riddled with gaps and ambiguities,
sought with uncertain success to provide immunity to space
launch operators from SFP suits.57
Instead, insurers have begun offering SFPs liability insurance
that SFPs may purchase.58 Whether the premium pricing of such
insurance will be attractive to SFPs is still left to be seen. Additionally, a so-called regulatory moratorium on launch vehicle design regulations aimed at protecting persons aboard those launch
vehicles, originally enacted in 2004, was extended in 2015, and it

53 See generally COM. ORBITAL TRANSP. SERVS., A NEW ERA OF SPACE FLIGHT
(2014) (providing a history of the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) program from 2006 to 2013).
54 Joe Colangelo, What the SpaceX Landing Says About Elon Musk–and Federal
CALLER
(Apr.
20,
2016),
Regulators,
DAILY
http://dailycaller.com/2016/04/20/what-the-spacex-landing-says-about-elonmusk-and-federal-regulators/
[https://perma.cc/LFY5-UN9Q]
(“Musk
is
practicing ‘permissionless innovation,’ which . . . means disrupting first and
asking for permission later, exploiting regulatory blind-spots.”).
55 See 51 U.S.C. § 50905(a)(5) (2012) (listing the requirements for the holder of
a license or a permit to launch or reenter a space flight participant).
56 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51,
§ 107 (describing requirements relevant to cross waivers).
57 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–55 (outlining liability issues relevant to
SFPs under the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, contractual
waivers under state common law, and state legislation granting space operators
partial immunity from liability).
58 See Matthew Schaefer, The Intersection of Insurance Markets and Liability
Regimes Regarding Third-Parties and Space Flight Participants in Commercial Space
Activities, 57TH IISL COLLOQUIA OF LAWS OF OUTER SPACE OF THE IISL (2014).
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will now remain in effect until the end of 2023.59 Instead of government regulations, the FAA worked with industry and NASA to
issue a non-binding set of guidelines regarding human space
flight.60 To be sure, there are a few issues that have arisen that
cause launch companies concern. For example, the reusable launch
vehicle regulations were really designed with Shuttle-type vehicles
in mind and instead it is operational reusablilty (i.e. reuse of first
stages) that is occurring first and so the current regulations are not
a perfect fit and require issuing a number of different waivers.61
Another issue that will likely arise as the small launch vehicle sector grows is a potential licensing bottleneck if each individual
launch is treated as an individual activity.62
Overall, the launch licensing process falls within a range of the
continuum that qualifies as permissionless innovation, and even
goes to the extent of incentivized permissionless innovation. In
other words, approval is required for these activities but is essentially never denied, and the government has used resources and
space act agreements to incentivize development of the launch sector.
When accidents occur, the government works with the private
sector under the companies’ own FAA-approved accident investigation plan to promptly resume activity.63 New reentry technologies for first stage boosters are facilitated. Launch companies can
operate vehicles under both an experimental permit and a launch
license.64 Companies are indemnified by the government for any
massive third-party damage caused by a space launch, and they
are also protected from negligence and gross negligence claims
59 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51, §
111 (outlining a regulatory framework relevant to standards and extension of
certain safety regulation requirements).
60 FAA, RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT OCCUPANT SAFETY
(2014) (“The purpose of this document is to provide a compilation of practices that
the [FAA] believes are important and recommends for commercial human space
flight occupant safety.”).
61 Discussions at 10th Annual University of Nebraska Washington D.C. Space
Law Conference, Sept. 15, 2017.
62 See id.
63 See FAA, FACT SHEET—COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES
(2017) (“The FAA requires commercial operators to file an investigation plan that
meets FAA regulations and contains the operator’s procedures for reporting and
responding to launch accidents, launch incidents, or other mishaps that may
occur. The FAA approves and oversees compliance with these plans.”).
64 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51, § 107.
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from those aboard the spacecraft.65 Regulation of design features
to protect occupants is not allowed (at least, for an initial period),
but industry standards (or government–industry standards) are
encouraged.
Thus, the approach to launch licensing and human spaceflight
meets many of the principles espoused by permissionless innovation proponents: pushing for self-regulation, waiting for insurance
markets to address problems, promoting education to minimize
risks, relying on existing legal regimes including the common law
of torts, reducing the immediate constraining impact of existing
tort regimes, and adopting targeted, limited legal measures.
3.2. Permissionless Innovation and NOAA Licensing of Remote
Sensing Satellites
Unlike FAA’s launch licensing regime and commercial human
space flight regulations, the remote National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) sensing licensing regime
under the Department of Commerce is never referred to in the
press or by industry as an example of permissionless innovation
thinking. The National and Commercial Space Programs,66 in essence the slightly updated version of the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act,67 states that “no person that is subject to the jurisdiction or control of the United States may . . . operate any private
remote sensing space system without a license.”68

65 14 C.F.R. § 440.17(b) (2016) (“The licensee . . . shall implement a reciprocal
waiver of claims . . . under which each party waives and releases claims against all
the other parties to the waiver and agrees to assume financial responsibility for
property damage it sustains and for bodily injury or property damage sustained
by its own employees, and to hold harmless and indemnify each other from
bodily injury or property damage sustained by its employees, resulting from a
licensed or permitted activity, regardless of fault.” (emphasis added)); Schaefer,
supra note 45, at 246 (“There is a statutory exception for ‘willful misconduct’ to the
waivers of liability, and the FAA has interpreted this language to mean that the
waivers prevent claims based on negligence as well as gross negligence claims.”).
66 See generally Act of Dec. 18, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124 Stat. 3328
(codifying existing laws related to national and commercial space programs).
67 See generally Land Remote Sending Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555,
106 Stat. 4163 (establishing a new national land remote sensing policy, among
other purposes).
68 Act of Dec. 18, 2010, supra note 64, § 60122(a).
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Federal regulations define a remote sensing system to mean
any satellite or system that “is capable of actively or passively sensing the Earth’s surface.”69 Over the past several years, this provision has been interpreted literally to account for all satellites capable of Earth-imaging. This interpretation is in response to concerns
over the proliferation of high-resolution imagery of high-value national security and diplomatic targets especially in the wake of a
significant relaxation of the resolution limitations on commercial
remote sensing imagery. Under this interpretation and with
changes in space technology, the number of licenses NOAA is taking under consideration has grown considerably—a phenomenon
described as an “explosion” by NOAA officials.70 All license applications must also be reviewed by the Department of Defense, the
Department of the Interior, the Department of State, and the
broader intelligence community to address their singular concerns.71
Once granted, licensees must operate systems in a way so as to
preserve U.S. national security, foreign policy, and international
obligations. Moreover, licensees must maintain operational control
from within the U.S., maintain records of operations, limit collection and dissemination of data as required, notify NOAA of foreign agreements to capture or sell imagery, report deviations and
anomalies, make data available to the Department of Interior, dispose of the system in a manner approved by NOAA, and submit a
data protection plan. NOAA conducts audits at various stages and
requires reports to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, and
license conditions.72 In the event of noncompliance, NOAA is authorized to revoke the license and suspend all sales of imagery captured by the system in question.73
15 C.F.R. § 960.3 (2017).
Alan Robinson, NOAA, NOAA’S COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING
REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2016).
71 See Glenn Tallia, NOAA’s Licensing of CubeSats as Private Remote Sensing
Space Systems Under the National and Commercial Space Policy Act (2012), AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION
(Jan.
20,
2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/science_techno
logy/1_20_12_licensing.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS8E-9MN7]
(describing, inter alia, general license conditions relevant to NOAA’s licensing of
cubesats as private remote sensing space systems).
72 Id.
73 See 15 C.F.R. § 960.15 (2013) (listing penalties and sanctions if a licensee
substantially failed to comply with Title II of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act
of 1992 (15 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.) (Pub. L. No. 102–555, 106 Stat. 4163)).
69
70
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Two of the major challenges facing remote sensing licensing are
the proliferation of small satellites—as well as the corresponding
increase in license applications74—and some high-profile delays in
licensing decisions.75 Indeed, the proliferation of small satellites
creates a unique issue for NOAA license reviewers. First, while
many of the small satellites are technically capable of sensing the
Earth, they generally pose no serious national security or diplomatic concerns. Additionally, many small satellites are not technologically capable of complying with orders from the Secretary of
Commerce to limit collection or dissemination of such imagery.
Together with increasingly long waits for license decisions, these
issues are creating pressure for licensure process reform.
Some suggest that re-interpreting the “capable of” language to
mean those satellites that will be designed and operated to image
the Earth could significantly alleviate the burden of license review.
Others suggest a green light “presumptive” licensing test, whereby, although the government is given a certain amount of time to
deny a license, an acceptance is assumed. There is always the risk,
though, that interagency gridlock will remain a barrier to a speedy
process. Moreover, some believe that small satellites are not so innocuous; ideas for a constellation of satellites capable of taking imagery of the same point on the surface multiple times a day, combined with high-level data analytics, pose potential serious
national security and foreign policy issues.
House Science Committee members have expressed frustration
that NOAA is not meeting deadlines for licensing decisions.76 Law
requires a decision within 120 days, but, in some high profile cases
involving major companies and systems, decisions have taken over

74 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Smallsat Constellations Spark Investor Interest, Regulator
Concerns, SPACENEWS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://spacenews.com/smallsatconstellations-spark-investor-interest-regulator-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/GP4R-6ZW6] (“Small satellites have already been constituting
a significant part of the FCC’s workload on the licensing side . . . . There has been
every indication that this workload is going to continue to increase.”).
75 See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI., SPACE & TECH., SMITH, BABIN QUESTION NOAA’S
DELAY OF SATELLITE IMAGERY PROVIDER’S LICENSE (June 6, 2016) (“[C]ommercial
satellite imagery provider DigitalGlobe is still awaiting a license approval to
sell . . . imagery data . . . almost three years after submitting the initial request,
well beyond the 120 day requirement.”).
76 See id. (“NOAA regulations state that the agency must give a reason for
[delays] and an estimate of when its review will be completed . . . [T]he
Committee would also like to know what has caused the delay in this application
and when NOAA anticipates this licensing action will be closed out.”).
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three years.77 For example, Digital Globe, the largest provider of
imagery to the U.S. government, waited over three years for a decision on its Worldview 3 satellite.78 Some of the concern stems from
the fact that these delays might lead to outsourcing of the remote
sensing business to foreign countries. There are recent efforts
within the Executive Branch in the form of a new interagency
Memorandum of Understanding to improve the process and avoid
lengthy delays,79 but Congress is considering more significant reforms.80
Unlike the launch licensing regime, the remote sensing licensing process currently does not seem to be driven by permissionless
innovation thinking. Permission is not de jure or de facto the default
position. Long overdue decisions and missed deadlines hold up
projects without transparency in the decision-making, and without
an opportunity to cure defects, through discussions pertaining to
alternatives. It is understandable—given national security concerns—that reliance is not placed on industry self-regulation, insurance markets, or “educate and empower” solutions.
Yet, efforts to enhance timely decisions, transparency of rationales in decision-making, and the opportunity to cure defects would
be improvements, as would the elaboration of an updated benefitcost analysis over national security concerns. For example, a twotiered approach to licensing could be considered—one for cube
satellites unlikely to have the technology to raise national security
concerns (e.g., more akin to obtaining a driver’s license) and one
for larger, more sophisticated satellites. More generally, decisionmakers in the interagency process may need to update benefit-cost
analyses by considering whether the proliferation of remote sensing satellites globally (as well as other methods for deriving infor-

See id. (referring explicitly to a “120 day requirement”).
Id. (“DigitalGlobe is still awaiting a license approval . . . almost three years
after submitting the initial request.”).
79 See Jeff Foust, NGA Director Supports Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory
Reform, SPACENEWS (Aug. 8, 2017), http://spacenews.com/nga-director-supportscommercial-remote-sensing-regulatory-reform/
[https://perma.cc/4BXJ-8684]
(“[T]he Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and Interior, as well as the
intelligence community, have updated a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
regarding [NOAA’s] interagency review.”).
80 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809,
115th Cong. (2017) (proposing an amendment “to title 51, United States Code, to
provide for the authorization and supervision of nongovernmental space
activities, and for other purposes.”).
77
78
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mation) make restrictions on U.S. commercial remote sensing companies a detriment to U.S. competitiveness without corresponding
increases in U.S. national security. The remote sensing licensing
regime highlights that permissionless innovation is a frame of
mind that must permeate policy-makers in the interagency discussions of applications. This latter element is why we might think of
the creation of an esprit de corps of permissionless innovation
thinking in interagency discussions.

3.3. Permissionless Innovation and FCC Licensing of Spectrum
Numerous spectrum battles and controversies arise out of new
space technologies and business models, including: controversies
connected to potential large increases in the number of launches,
disputes between potential LEO and existing GEO satellite operators,81 competition amongst the various LEO satellite proposals,82
competition between terrestrial 5G wireless demands and satellites,83 and the potential increase in the use of optical communications (laser) in satellite plans.84 There are few legislative proposals
that touch on these controversies that are being handled through
FCC proceedings. Spectrum battles tend to be resolved in an area
of the regulatory continuum quite far from the purest forms of
permissionless innovation. Due to the limited nature of spectrum

81 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, One Web Fails (At Least for Now) to Soothe
Satellite
Interference
Fears,
SPACENEWS,
Sept.
18,
2015,
http://spacenews.com/oneweb-fails-at-least-for-now-to-soothe-satelliteinterference-fears/ [https://perma.cc/S8A6-WFDM] (mentioning the potential
issues to current and future satellites by increasing the number of LEO and GEO
satellite systems).
82 See, e.g., Klint Finley, Internet by Satellite is a Space Race with No Winners,
WIRED, June 12, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/06/elon-musk-space-xsatellite-internet/ [https://perma.cc/7KR5-FKRC] (detailing that competition
between OneWeb and SpaceX in their race to provide internet to rural
populations).
83 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, FCC Chairman to Satellite Industry: Shut Up,
SPACENEWS MAG., Aug. 1, 2016, https://www.spacenewsmag.com/the-bottomline/fcc-chairman-to-satellite-industry-shut-up/
[https://perma.cc/2D82WHML] (stating that the FCC Chairman discouraged criticism of the 5G FCC
ruling).
84 See Finley, supra note 82 (noting that SpaceX applied to the FCC to begin
testing).
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and the potential for interference from overlapping spectrum uses,
spectrum allocations require heavy ex ante government involvement in most instances. Communications satellites, due to the expensive capital investment, must have dedicated, licensed spectrum to justify the business case. Additionally, a GEO satellite will
need the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to allocate
the orbital slot and frequency for the satellite, but importantly ITU
permission is usually provided on a first-come, first-served basis.85
Similar to use of permissionless innovation arguments by the two
competing sides in the net neutrality debate in the cyber domain,
in many of the space and satellite examples detailed below permissionless innovation might be advocated for by those with competing interests. As in the case of the net neutrality debate, providing
greater permissionless innovation for one party’s interest in the
space domain concerning spectrum may negatively impact the
ability for the competing technology or business model to engage
in permissionless innovation.
3.3.1. Spectrum for An Increased Number and Cadence of
Commercial Launches
Concern is growing that increased launches from the United
States may create further procedural bottlenecks and administrative burdens with respect to spectrum needed for commercial
space launch activities. Currently, spectrum for launch vehicles is
allocated under special temporary authority by the FCC on the basis of experimental authorizations. The spectrum allocated is federal spectrum and can only be used on a non-interference basis.86
This concern over administrative burdens in obtaining spectrum

85 See,
e.g., FRANS VON DER DUNK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS, HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 475–84 (VON DER DUNK & TRONCHETTI
eds., 2015); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 236–39 (2009)
(noting some reforms of the ITU’s first-come, first-served approach); Lawrence D.
Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the International
Telecommunications Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1111–14 (2000) (noting the
problems of the ITU regulatory regime with regard to geostationary satellites);
Patrick S. Ryan, The ITU and the Internet’s Titanic Moment, 8 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
85–86 (2012) (discussing the history of the ITU and the differences between the
ITU’s past regulatory subjects and the internet).
86 FCC, DA 13-446, GUIDANCE ON OBTAINING EXPERIMENTAL AUTHORIZATIONS
FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, (2013).
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for space launch vehicles is reflected in Rep. Bridenstine’s proposed Space Renaissance Act (HR4945) in Section 309(h). The bill
calls upon the FCC and Department of Commerce to ensure the
process for obtaining authorization to use spectrum for a space
launch is “standardized and clearly defined” and to “minimize the
number and complexity of such authorizations required per launch
mission.”87 In light of its goal of assured access to spectrum for
commercial launches it also calls for the allocation of spectrum of
launch activities on a “co-primary, interference-protected basis.”88
3.3.2. Spectrum Battles Arising from LEO Satellite Constellations
Numerous companies have plans at various stages for large
constellations of LEO satellites to provide broadband internet and
other services. There are concerns in at least certain portions of the
globe that the LEO systems could cause interference with existing
GEO systems.89 Such concerns are exacerbated by the growing
number of LEO satellite business plans being developed.90
Concerns exist that “spectrum warehousing” or “paper satellite” strategies may occur through the use of foreign telecom administrations to delay or block the most likely LEO satellite constellations and systems. More specifically, there are concerns that
the ease of acquiring spectrum rights through some foreign administrations’ requests to the ITU can create “false competitors who
are out to impede . . . serious space companies.”91 Possible reforms
87

(2016)

American Space Renaissance Act, H.R. Res. 4945, 114th Cong. § 309(h)

Id.
See Jeff Faust, Low Earth Orbit Constellations Could Pose Interference Risk to
GEO Satellites, SPACENEWS, Oct. 25, 2015, http://spacenews.com/low-earth-orbitconstellations-could-pose-interference-risk-to-geo-satellites/
[https://perma.cc/GMQ4-F66X] (noting that even if new satellites comply with
ITU rules they can cause problems for newer and more sensitive satellites).
90 See, e.g., Alan Boyle, 5G or not 5G? Boeing Joins the Battle Over Broadband
Satellite
Spectrum,
GEEKWIRE,
June
23,
2016,
http://www.geekwire.com/2016/boeing-battle-broadband-internet-satellite/
[https://perma.cc/Z6G3-AZJ4] (stating that Boeing plans to put over 1,000
satellites into low Earth orbit).
91 See, e.g., Jason Koebler, SpaceX Warns Fake Competitors Could Disrupt Its
Mar.
9,
2015,
Space
Internet
Plan,
MOTHERBOARD,
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmj34d/spacex-warns-papersatellites-could-disrupt-its-space-internet-plan [https://perma.cc/JG33-E3M2]
88
89
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within the ITU include increasing the number of satellites that
must be launched and operated within a set number of years and
creating milestones for contracting and constructing satellites to
better distinguish between “paper satellites” and genuine endeavors.92 Issues are also raised regarding the interaction between the
FCC and ITU approaches. The current FCC approach is to use a
processing round procedure for LEO satellite spectrum applications in contrast to the first-come, first-served approach for GEO
satellite spectrum allocations through the ITU.
3.3.3. Spectrum Battles Between Satellite and Terrestrial 5G
Recently departed FCC Chairman Wheeler leaned hard on the
satellite industry to cooperate with potential future 5G terrestrial
users of 28GHz spectrum on potential sharing of that spectrum.93
At ITU’s World Radio Conference in 2015 (WRC-15), the satellite
industry successfully defended their 28GHz rights; however this
frustrated the FCC, which was looking for more willingness for a
study on possible sharing of the spectrum with terrestrial 5G users
in the band.94 It appears, regardless of what happens internationally—WRC-19 will likely re-examine the issues—that the U.S. is going to be seeking spectrum sharing in the 28GHz band, although
new FCC Chairman Pai has not yet addressed the issue in detail.95
92 See Faust, supra note 89 (“[S]ome raised questions about another aspect of
ITU rules regarding NGSO systems. Current regulations consider an NGSO
system to be brought into use, and its frequency rights confirmed, when the first
satellite of a constellation is launched, regardless of the number of satellites in the
constellation. ‘This makes sense when you have a constellation of 10 or 12
satellites,’ said Jose Albuquerque, chief of the satellite division of the Federal
Communication Commission’s International Bureau. ‘But when you’re talking
about constellations of 800 or 4,000 satellites, you cannot acquire rights by
bringing one satellite into service.’”); On the issue of paper satellites, see generally
Von der Dunk, supra note 85, at 485–87; Lyall & Larson, supra note 85, at 236–39.
93 See de Selding, supra note 14 (noting that Chairman Wheeler advocated
studying the possibility of sharing the 28GHz spectrum at the World
Radiocommunication Conference).
94 Id.
95 See Caleb Henry, Trump’s FCC Chairman Favors Simpler Satellite Licensing
Rules, SPACENEWS, Jan. 24, 2017, http://spacenews.com/trumps-fcc-chairmanfavors-simpler-satellite-licensing-rules/ [https://perma.cc/T9JW-EUTN] (noting
the appointment of FCC chairman Ajit Pai and his desire to close the digital
divide as well as state he has not made clear how satellites will fit into his
broadband goal).
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Separately, a coalition of 5G terrestrial broadband companies in
June 2016 petitioned the FCC to remove 500MHz of Ku-band (between 12.2 GHz and 12.7 GHz) that currently gives priority access
to LEO satellite internet constellations.96 Sharing within the Kuband between 5G and LEO satellites will not be possible, but sharing with direct broadcast GEO satellite signals in the band with 5G
users may be possible, although this is also in dispute.97
3.3.4. Possibility of Laser Communications
Some new satellite ideas may seek to use laser communications
to avoid the need for spectrum rights, particularly for inter-satellite
communications. Laser communications98 have the potential benefit of a faster and higher capacity movement of data than RF communications.99 However, laser communications have unique features that must overcome challenges like cloud cover, turbulence,
and other atmospheric disturbances.100 NASA has already demonstrated the technology for Moon-Earth communications and is proceeding with space-to-space and space-to-ground applications.101
Space optical communications are currently unregulated, and there

96 See Peter B. de Selding, Dish Network Battles OneWeb and SpaceX for Ku-Band
Spectrum Rights, SPACENEWS, June 9, 2016, http://spacenews.com/dish-networkbattles-oneweb-and-spacex-for-ku-band-spectrum-rights/.
[https://perma.cc/8AKU-EDK4] (detailing that Dish Network and other
companies asked U.S. regulators to strip certain satellites of their priority access to
500 MHz of Ku-band spectrum).
97 Id.
98 See,
e.g., Nicholas Gerbis, How Laser Communication Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, Feb. 24, 2017, http://science.howstuffworks.com/lasercommunication.htm [https://perma.cc/T7QY-AG66] (describing how laser
technology works).
99 See, e.g., Donald Cornwell, Space-Based Laser Communications Break
Threshold, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS, May 2016, http://www.osaopn.org/home/articles/volume_27/may_2016/features/spacebased_laser_communications_break_threshold/
[https://perma.cc/HJA6AMM3] (stating that satellite lasers can communicate at “[i]nternet-like speeds.”).
100 Id.
101 See
NASA, Laser Demonstration Reveals Bright Future for Space
Communications,
NASA,
Dec.
23,
2103,
https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/laser-demonstration-reveals-brightfuture-for-space-communication [https://perma.cc/B3MM-R9LQ] (noting that
lunar laser communication missions have revealed the possibility of expanding
capabilities in space laser communications).
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is a debate as to what extent the FCC could exercise authority over
lasers.102 However, questions of interference could embolden the
FCC to fill the void.
3.3.5. Summary
Technology development that needs or concerns licensed spectrum—and the satellite business demands the certainty of licensed
spectrum—due to its limited, finite nature—will always involve a
good deal of ex ante government permissions from both the FCC
and the ITU. Whether it is additional more certain spectrum for
the increased cadence of space launches, new large constellation
LEO satellite plans, terrestrial 5G wireless intrusions into high frequency satellite spectrum, or even laser communication proposals,
the FCC and ITU will be rather heavily involved on the regulatory
front. For GEO systems, orbital slots and allocations are largely
first-come, first-served rewarding first-moving innovators. For
LEO systems, the FCC conducts a processing round seeking to accommodate interests of both first-movers and those that soon after
also declare interest and the ITU regulates interference issues to a
degree. Resorting to industry self-regulation, insurance markets,
common law (of torts), and educate and empower solutions are
largely avoided given the dynamics, although there are some elements that encourage cooperation among competing industries in
the 5G terrestrial versus satellite situation rather than the government imposing a solution.
4. PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION FOR NEW ON-ORBIT ACTIVITIES:
THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION LIMIT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
LIMIT, AND THE INVESTOR CERTAINTY LIMIT
Thus, for traditional space activities we observe a range of regulatory models: 1) an FAA launch and reentry and human space
flight framework that certainly is closest to the permissionless in-

102 See generally Joel Thayer, Lasering in on the Federal Communications
Commission: Can the FCC Regulate Laser Communications, 6 AM. U. INTELL. PROP.
BRIEF 99–128 (2015) (arguing the FCC does have authority under current law to
regulate laser communications and is the proper agency to regulate them).
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novation ideal; 2) a NOAA remote sensing regime that is perhaps
overbroad, impacting innovative small satellite ideas, and that
struggles with establishing a permissionless innovation esprit de
corps in the interagency process as participants have yet to fully
reassess benefit-cost analysis of national security concerns in an
environment where foreign remote sensing systems are increasingly sophisticated; and 3) an FCC spectrum licensing regime that by
necessity, given the properties of spectrum and the demands of the
satellite business case, must have significant ex ante government
involvement. All those regulatory models are long-established and
will take considerable effort to change.
In contrast, regulating new on-orbit space activities begins with
a relatively clean slate. There is no formal regulatory framework in
place, although the government has leveraged its launch licensing
authority, especially its payload review prong, to a degree to partially fill the gap. The only other exception to this clean slate is that
for well over a decade NOAA and the FCC have imposed debris
mitigation requirements on licensees—presumably relying on their
“public interest” authority to do so—although some believe even
this limited on-orbit regulation constitutes “competence creep.”103
Staunch permissionless innovation advocates might say this essentially clean slate is a victory and should be maintained. In essence,
companies are free to conduct new on-orbit activities if they so
choose, and the government need not authorize those activities,
nor may the government prohibit those activities. In fact, permissionless innovation advocates might say this is almost an ideal scenario, in that the current state of affairs achieves (near) pure or unadulterated permissionless innovation. However, the irony is that
the benefits of permissionless innovation will not be achieved in
this (nearly) pure state.
There are at least three major risks to allowing calls for a pure
or unadulterated permissionless innovation regulatory model with
respect to new on-orbit activities. First, it is very clear that U.S. international obligations require “authorization” of and the provision of “continuing” supervision, by the government of commercial activities in outer space.
Thus, any pure version of
permissionless innovation would run afoul of U.S. international
obligations in the primary space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty.
Second, with the national security implications of many space ac-

103

See von der Dunk, supra note 34, at 171–73.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/4

2017]

Contours of Permissionless Innovation

135

tivities, it is unrealistic to expect adoption of a pure permissionless
innovation regulatory model to govern such activities; the industry
largely recognizes this dynamic. Third, a large number of businesses and investors in the space sector seek a minimal amount of
regulation to ensure a transparent framework for approval of their
on-orbit activities so that regulatory uncertainty and foreign hostility to their activities is minimized.104 For each of these reasons, a
failure by Congress to create explicit “light touch” authorization
and supervision authority in an Executive Branch agency will actually defeat the purposes of permissionless innovation.
Of course, the Executive Branch will have incentives to continue to leverage its payload review authority to try to ensure that
U.S. international obligations are met and that U.S. national security is not endangered, and to give companies and their investors a
degree of regulatory approval and certainty they desire. Chairman
Babin and former FAA officials have argued that because the
OST’s Article VI is not a self-executing international obligation,
and thus not automatically part of the U.S. legal system, the Administration cannot seek to authorize or supervise new on-orbit
space activities unless Congress passes a law delegating authorization and supervision responsibility to the Executive Branch.105 This
may well be true but the situation is slightly more complex. Congress has already delegated payload review authority to the FAA,

104 See Marcia Smith, Bridenstine: This is Our Sputnik Moment & the Moon Will
Ensure U.S. Preeminence in Space, SPACEPOLICYONLINE (Nov. 2, 2016 12:00 AM),
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/bridenstine-this-is-our-sputnikmoment-the-moon-will-ensure-u-s-preeminence-in-space.
[https://perma.cc/PR4Q-VMF4] (explaining that a significant private investment
in space could be stopped by the U.S. State Department due to actions and
protests in foreign countries).
105 See Babin, supra note 2 (“The previous Administration failed to remember
that the Outer Space Treaty is not self-executing. The executive branch, unless
explicitly authorized by Congress, should not deny an American citizen the right
to explore and use Outer Space.”); See also Laura Montgomery, Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty is not Self-Executing and Should Not be Treated as an Obstacle to
Private Space Activity, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/10/14/article-vi-is-notself-executing-and-should-not-be-treated-as-an-obstacle-to-private-space-activity/
[https://perma.cc/KW4P-4FYH] (“[N]ot all provisions of the Outer Space Treaty
are self-executing, so until Congress acts, those treaty provisions don’t bind
private operators. That logic applies to the treaty’s Article VI as well.”).
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and a factor to consider under a payload review is U.S. international obligations.106
One might argue ensuring no violation of international obligations (self-executing or not) is thus an objective the FAA can consider in a payload review. However, the counterpoint is that the
Executive Branch lacks the power to consider international obligation compliance for on-orbit activities because Congress, when
granting re-entry licensing authority in 1997, indicated it did not
want to grant on-orbit authority at that time.107 This places the U.S.
Executive Branch in a difficult position—the Hobbesian choice of
complying with international obligations or acting consistently
with apparent Congressional intent.
Similarly, space businesses—the innovators—are also put in a
poor position. They could simply seek to pursue any on-orbit activity they like, and then pursue litigation if the Executive Branch
blocks an activity that, for example, the government believes
would violate U.S. international obligations or endanger U.S. national security. The “pursue and litigate” strategy is not an attractive option for many space companies. Litigation consumes time
and money, and global competitors may advance during that time.
Additionally, the dynamics of the space business are such that the
government is always a considerable part of the customer base,
and suing one’s customer is not necessarily an attractive option. If
the U.S. Executive Branch chooses the alternate path and stands
down by not blocking the activity nor authorizing it, then space
businesses, particularly those involved with international partners
or an international customer base, would need to worry about potential foreign government actions for failure by the U.S. government to meet international obligations. For example, a foreign
government might block cooperation by a partner or prevent customers in its territory from purchasing goods or services connected
with the activity. That is why on-orbit businesses have been
“knocking on the door” of various agencies, including the State
Department, the last several years, in essence asking who will give
them a stamp of approval. It is an uncertain process currently—

106 See 14 C.F.R. § 415.51 (2016) (stating that the FAA reviews payloads for
adherence to “U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, . . . international
obligations of the United States . . . [and] safety requirements.”).
107 See H.R. REP. NO. 105–347 (1997) (noting that a license is not required for
an “on-orbit operation” completed “after a launch . . . and before reentry[.]”).
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one that U.S. space businesses desire to be made certain and transparent.
We explore each of these three risks—international obligation
risk, national security risk, and regulatory uncertainty risk—below,
with particular emphasis on meeting U.S. international obligations.
Particular emphasis is placed on meeting U.S. international obligations because it appears that a drive for a (nearly) pure form of
permissionless innovation is leading to misguided treaty interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty that do not respect long-standing
rules of treaty interpretation binding the United States and constitutes a development that can damage U.S. interests in other treaty
regimes too. The analysis below reveals that the U.S. Congress can
establish an authorization regime that meets U.S. international obligations, allows the U.S. government to protect national security,
and provides regulatory certainty for U.S. space business investors,
while at the same time achieving the benefits, and retaining the essence, of permissionless innovation thinking.
4.1. International Obligation Risk
The United States currently has a regulatory gap pertaining to
on-orbit activities that occur between launch and reentry by its
commercial actors. Outside of spectrum use (already requiring an
FCC license), systems capable of sensing the Earth (already requiring a NOAA license), and debris mitigation requirements imposed
by those agencies, on-orbit activities are not regulated or separately
authorized. This gap creates compliance issues with U.S. international obligations under Article VI of the OST. Proof of five propositions is necessary to establish that such a gap violates U.S. international obligations and that complying with those obligations by
filling the gap will not require any wholesale abandonment of
permissionless innovation thinking. The five propositions are as
follows:
(1) The OST requires the U.S. government to “authorize”
and provide “continuing supervision” of its commercial
actors’ space activities, at least in part in order to ensure
compliance with OST provisions;
(2) Ensuring compliance with OST obligations by its commercial actors only requires minimal, light touch regu-
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lation because OST obligations are few in number,
many do not implicate commercial plans, and those that
do are minimally constraining;
(3) Congress made clear in the legislative history to the
1998 amendments to U.S. commercial space legislation
that outside of FCC and NOAA licensing regimes for
spectrum use and remote sensing, respectively, it was
not granting authority to FAA or any other federal
agency to regulate on-orbit activities;
(4) There are limits to how far the FAA can stretch or utilize its existing payload review process to address onorbit issues; and
(5) Current FCC authority and NOAA authority does not
allow the United States to ensure compliance by commercial actors with OST obligations.
Proof of Proposition #1
Let’s start with my first claim, specifically that the OST requires
the U.S. government to authorize and provide continuing supervision of its commercial space activities, in part to ensure compliance
with OST provisions by its commercial actors. To begin, let’s cover
some basics of international law. Most international law applies to
States (governments) but not to private actors directly. This is true
of the vast majority of customary international law and most treaties.
There are, of course, some exceptions. Rules against piracy and
genocide apply to private actors in customary international law.108
Some treaties, such as the Montreal Convention,109 which lays out
rules for air carriers, and private international law conventions,

108 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under Customary International
Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1045, 1047–8 (2012) (stating that piracy and genocide are
punishable against private actors).
109 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by
Air,
Nov.
4,
2003,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22001A0718(01):EN:HTML
[https://perma.cc/AN8Y-3Z3B].
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like the Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG),110 apply
to private actors, although in the case of CISG parties can contract
to opt-out of its provisions. But these are exceptions to the general
rule.
Like most international law, the OST does not apply directly to
private actors. Its obligations do not say “States Parties and their
nationals shall . . . . “ All of its requirements apply to “State Parties.” For this reason, arguments are made that OST obligations do
not apply to private, commercial actors at all. In an attempt to buttress this argument, proponents of this view point out that the
drafters of the OST showed they knew how to make obligations
applicable to nationals by directly saying so.111 The proponents of
this view point to Article IX of the OST where it says the following:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment . . . .112
However, this obligation, like all others in the OST, only applies directly to State Parties. There is no obligation imposed on
nationals of State Parties to consult with anyone. The obligation is
on a State Party to consult when it or one of its nationals is planning an activity that would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities of other States Parties. A State Party will presumably be aware of its national’s activities in outer space because under Article VI State Parties must authorize and provide continuing
supervision of their nationals’ space activities.
110 See generally
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [https://perma.cc/6DEN-A55L].
111 See Laura Montgomery, Planetary Protection and Its Applicability to the
BASED
SPACE
MATTERS
(Oct.
3,
2016),
Private
Sector,
GROUND
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/10/03/planetaryprotection-and-its-applicability-to-the-private-sector/#more-133
[https://perma.cc/543X-PBJ8] (“When the drafters of the treaty intended a
particular provision to apply to non-governmental entities they said so.”).
112 OST, supra note 16, Art. IX (emphasis added).
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In fact, Article VI goes further and contains a unique rule, one
not found in virtually any other treaty, that pure permissionless
innovation-inspired treaty interpretation ignores or misreads. Article VI provides:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate
State Party to the Treaty . . . .113
Before we examine these provisions, it is useful to address the
issue of state responsibility in international law more generally.
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility provide in its first two articles the following:
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.114
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when
conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b)Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State.115
Thus, for international responsibility to be incurred by a State,
there needs to be an act or omission attributable to the State under
international law and a breach of an international obligation. Article VI of the OST indicates that States Parties are internationally responsible for national activities in space, even when they are carried on by its commercial actors, and State Parties are also directed
by Article VI to assure that national activities, including those by
its commercial actors, are carried out in conformity with the provi-

Id. Art. VI (emphasis added).
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 65-70 (2001).
115 Id. art. 2.
113
114
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sions set forth in the OST. Thus, if a U.S. commercial entity does
something that would run counter to an OST obligation, the United
States would bear international responsibility for that violation.116
Normally, under international law, private party activity is only attributable to the State where the State directs or assumes effective control over the activity. For example, in the ILC Articles on
State Responsibility, Article 8 states:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying
out the conduct.117
But the first sentence of Article VI makes States Parties to the
OST internationally responsible, even when they do not meet the
direction or control test. To be sure, the OST Article VI’s second
sentence requires “authorization” and “continuing supervision” by
a State party over its commercial actors’ space activities, but it is
unlikely that that level of involvement alone would meet the ILC
Article 8 standard. In any event, the first sentence of Article VI,
which makes State Parties internationally responsible, eliminates
the need to answer that question definitively.
Article VI also requires States Parties to “authorize” and provide “continuing supervision” for its commercial actors’ space activities, at least in part to help assure that its commercial actors
comply with OST provisions.118 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT) requires interpretation of a treaty based on
the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and
in light of its object and purpose.119 While the United States is not a
party to the VCLT, it does recognize the treaty interpretation rules
(along with many other rules) in the VCLT as binding as a matter

116 See IRMARD MARBOE, NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE
LAW 127, 131–34 (von der Dunk & Tronchetti eds., 2015) (noting that States Parties
to the OST are internationally responsible for outer space activities of nongovernmental entities).
117 OST, supra note 14, art. 8 (emphasis added).
118 MARBOE, supra note 114, at 131–32.
119 See Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose.”).
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of customary international law.120 The first sentence of Article VI
(referring to assuring conformity) provides context for the “authorize” and “continuing supervision” obligation in the second sentence.121 When authorizing and supervising, a State Party is to, at a
minimum, seek to assure conformity by its commercial space actors with OST provisions. The ordinary meaning of ‘authorize’ is
“give official permission or approval to,” or “to give official permission for something to happen.”122 The ordinary meaning of
‘supervision’ is to “monitor,” and the ordinary meaning of ‘continuing’ is “occurring in a cyclical or repetitious pattern.”123 In short,
authorization and continuing supervision require some process to
“give official permission or approval to,” and “monitor” in some
“cyclical or repetitious pattern” for the purpose of assuring that
commercial actors are complying with OST obligations. Thus,
while there is certainly some flexibility in how to implement the
Article VI obligation, permissionless innovation advocates go too
far when they claim that “Article VI contains three relevant ambiguous terms [(“authorization,” “continuing supervision,” and “activities”)] that the drafters appear to have left to different countries
to define as they see fit . . . .”124 Rather, the drafters undoubtedly
thought that the treaty, like all other treaties, would be interpreted
in accordance with internationally binding rules on treaty interpretation as reflected in the VCLT, which was formulated at the same
time as the Outer Space Treaty—the mid-1960s. The American
Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, reported by the House Science Committee on June 8, 2017, could be improved by explicitly

120 See
U.S. STATE DEP’T, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—TREATIES,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last accessed Feb. 24, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T7RH-4YBQ] (“The United States considers many of the
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute
customary international law on the law of treaties.”).
121 See MARBOE, supra note 114, at 132 n.14
122 MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY,
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/authorize (last
accessed Feb. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8WE9-L4QE].
123 BUSINESS
DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/continuing.html (last accessed
Feb. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TFU8-8AR5].
124 Laura Montgomery, By the Outer Space Treaty’s Own Terms, The U.S.
Complies with Article VI, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Dec. 17, 2016),
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/12/17/by-the-outerspace-treatys-own-terms-the-u-s-complies-with-article-vi-of-the-treaty/#more-245
[https://perma.cc/ZV8E-EXDW].
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acknowledging the VCLT rules when it calls upon the federal government “to interpret . . . its international obligations under the
Outer Space Treaty in a manner that minimizes regulations and
limitations on the freedom of United States nongovernmental entities to explore and use space . . . [and] in a manner that promotes
free enterprise in space.”125 As we will see in the next section, one
does not have to stray from VCLT treaty interpretation rules in order to ensure a minimally burdensome set of obligations on commercial entities under the OST.

Proof of Proposition #2: Ensuring compliance with OST obligations by its commercial actors only requires minimal, lighttouch regulations.
The OST only has seventeen articles—the last four of which
deal with ratification, amendment, termination, and official languages of the treaty.126 An additional article deals with application
of the treaty to “international intergovernmental organizations.”127
Taking into account Article VI’s text and purposes, there are only
eleven articles that could theoretically impose substantive obligations. However, Article XI is a weak obligation “to the greatest extent practicable and feasible” for States to inform the UN Secretary
General and the scientific community of their space activities.128 So
in reality there are only ten articles that could impose substantive
constraints on private space activities.
Yet, many of the ten remaining articles’ substantive obligations
do not in any way implicate private, commercial activities. Indeed,

125 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3.
126 OST, supra note 16, arts. XIV–XVII.
127 See id. art. XIII (“The provisions of [the OST] shall apply to the activities of
States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space[,] . . .
including cases where they are carried on within the framework of intergovernmental organizations.”).
128 See id. art. XI (“In order to promote international co-operation in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, State Parties to the Treaty conducting
activities in outer space . . . agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United
Nations . . . to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct,
locations and results of such activities.”).
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some actually empower those activities. Article I is empowering
rather than limiting in most respects as it mandates “freedom of
exploration and use” of outer space.129 The ordinary meaning of
the word “use” would include exploitation. If there is any ambiguity in that, the negotiating history confirms it. Most delegations at
the time of drafting the OST agreed with the French delegate that
“use” included exploitation, and the French delegate even mentioned uses of the moon, such as extraction of minerals.130 Article I
does contain additional language that the exploration “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and
shall be the province of all mankind.” However, the “benefit” and
“province of mankind” language is universally interpreted to not
require, for example, any resource or profit sharing; rather, it is referring to “benefit” in the more general sense that society benefits
from the exploration.131
Article IV’s prohibition on placement of WMDs in orbit or on
celestial bodies does not implicate commercial space activities.132
Article V has an obligation for astronauts to render all possible assistance to one another in carrying out their activities, but it is often
difficult for this assistance to occur in the space environment and,
in any event, would only implicate human space flight activities.133
The United States is party to the follow-on 1970 Return and Rescue
Agreement laying out more detailed obligations, but, again, commercial human space flight operators are highly unlikely to be
burdened by any of these obligations.

129 See id. art. I (“The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries . . . “).
130 See Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 431 (1967) (describing the discussions around the
drafting of the Outer Space Treaty).
131 See Stephen Gorove, Implications of International Space Law for Private
Enterprise, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 319, 321 (1982) (interpreting the language
of the treaty as not imposing specific obligations on private enterprises to share
acquired benefits); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 83, at 62–63 See also Frans von der
Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE L. 29, 57–59 (Frans von der
Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
132 See OST, supra note 16, art. IV .
133 See id. art. V (“In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial
bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the
astronauts of other State Parties.”).
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OST Article VII and the follow-on 1972 Liability Convention
with more detailed rules only implicate a government’s pocket
book by requiring the provision of compensation for the international aspects of third-party liability.134 Private commercial actors
face no burden via these obligations. Rather, the United States has
a detailed regulatory regime applicable to both domestic and international third-party liability situations, discussed briefly earlier
in the Article, in which commercial launch operators are required
to purchase third-party liability insurance up to the maximum
probable loss (on average around $90 million in coverage with
premiums at 0.1% of that amount) and the government has in place
a long-term (ten-year) promise to indemnify the launch operators
for the next $2.8 billion in liability.135 All others involved in the
space launch (e.g., suppliers, contractors, customers, and SFPs)
benefit as additional insureds on the policy purchased by the
launch licensee and also benefit from the promise of government
indemnification.136 The U.S. government currently does not require the purchase of on-orbit third-party liability insurance policies, although some other countries, like the United Kingdom,
do.137 The United States could elect to enact such a requirement as
part of an on-orbit regulatory scheme. Importantly, however, Article VII does not require these domestic requirements, so it is not
imposing any constraints or costs on commercial private actors.
Article VIII essentially creates what many believe is an indefinite ownership rule concerning space assets which largely benefits
commercial space actors by preventing theft of their assets and installations when in-orbit, on a celestial body, or even upon return

134 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 263–65 (explaining that the Liability
Convention does not cover single rocket or single aircraft accidents); see also
Stephan Hobe, Legal Aspects of Space Tourism, 86 NEB. L. REV. 439, 450 (2007)
(discussing the inability for passengers to claim compensation under the Liability
Convention).
135 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 11490, 129 Stat. 704, § 102(d) (“Launch Liability Extension.—Section 50915(f) is
amended by striking ‘December 31, 2016’ and inserting ‘September 30, 2025’”); see
also Schaefer, supra note 45, at 230–32 (explaining the U.S. third-party liability
regime).
136 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 11490, 129 Stat. 704, § 103 (“Indemnification for Space Flight Participants”); Schaefer,
supra note 45, at 263 (recommending SFPs be included in the indemnification
regime); see also 51 U.S.C. § 50914 (2011)).
137 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 230 n.23 (explaining U.K. requirement for
satellite operators to have third-party liability insurance).
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to Earth.138 In terms of on-orbit activities, the indefinite ownership
rule only potentially creates problems for entities wishing to engage in active debris remediation of another nation’s debris in a
non-consensual fashion. Even here, potential constraints are reduced because smaller-sized space debris under ten centimeters,
and even some larger debris, is of unknown origin, and thus would
not require any form of consent to remediate.139 Further, Article
VIII requires a registering state to maintain jurisdiction and control
over its space objects, and a separate Registration Convention, to
which the United States is a party, lays out obligations on registration. Article VIII’s obligation to maintain jurisdiction may be another reason for the United States to fill the regulatory gap with respect to on-orbit activities, but it does not require any particular
level of regulation.140
What remains are Articles II, IX, X, and XII. Article X and XII
obligations are worded quite softly:
Article X
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this
Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of
space objects launched by those States.

138 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Analogues Between Space Law and Law of the
Sea/International Maritime Law: Can Space Law Usefully Borrow or Adapt Rules from
these Other Areas of Public International Law? 55 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 316 (2012)
(“[T]he ownership provision would appear to prevent any vacuum from
occurring such that an entity wishing to conduct [active debris remediation] could
still not seize the object. The ownership of a space object in perpetuity, even once
defunct or broken apart, under Art. VIII is thus the first major element of the
space law regime creating a dilemma for those interested in pursuing” active
debris remediation.”). See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 83, at 67, 307 (stating that
space objects cannot become abandoned property).
139 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 136 (discussing the difficulties of
implementing liability salvage).
140 See von der Dunk, supra note 34, at 159 (“As the current substance of
obligations under international space law is relatively limited in size and scope, in
particular as regards the specifics of private activities and their rights and
interests, the requirement resting upon states to actually and effectively exercise
and implement jurisdiction could still result in a rather ‘light’ version thereof.”).
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The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by
agreement between the States concerned.141
Article XII
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of
reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate
consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal
operations in the facility to be visited.142
Article X’s obligation is only an obligation to consider requests
to observe the flight of space objects, not an obligation to approve
such requests. Additionally, any such opportunity to observe and
any conditions imposed are to be determined by agreement between the States. Similarly, Article XII’s obligation has a good degree of flexibility. While it says that stations, installations, and
equipment on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open for
visits, it is only on the basis of “reciprocity,” and it also makes clear
that conditions can be imposed for safety and to avoid interference
with operations. Thus, for example, Planetary Resources’ future
rovers or stations on asteroids, or Bigelow Aerospace’s future lunar
habitats, would only need to be open on the basis of “reciprocity,”
potentially limiting it to the very few other countries, if any, with
similarly employed technology. But even if reciprocity is not so
narrowly interpreted,143 only a few countries with technological
and financial abilities could even potentially invoke the right. Additionally, any such visit is subject to any safety and operational
conditions or limits deemed necessary.144 Finally, it is quite possible that “the context and object and purpose of the provision may
OST, supra note 16, art. X (emphasis added).
Id. art. XII (emphasis added).
143 For the negotiating history of the article and the term “reciprocity,” see
Dembling & Arons, supra note 130, at 448–50 (noting that the U.S. maintained an
interpretation of reciprocity that was more open to visits than the Soviets did
during the negotiations).
144 For the negotiating history on these limits and conditions, see id.
141
142
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very well indicate that it was intended to allow verification of arms
control provisions of the OST, thus obviating the need for visits to
U.S. commercial stations and equipment.”145 And even if it is ultimately determined that a visit is required and clears all the requisite legal and practical hurdles, the U.S. government could go a
step further and agree to reimburse U.S. commercial companies for
the costs incurred as a result of any such visits.
The last remaining articles, and those most frequently pointed
to as potentially imposing significant limits on private activities,
are Article II and Article IX. Article II states the following: “Outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation, or by any other means.”146 This might at first glance
be considered a limit on asteroid or lunar mining (either for in-situ
resource utilization or return of materials to Earth), but the longstanding U.S. interpretation, shared by a sizeable number of countries (roughly one-third) represented in the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) is that this provision
does not prevent private property rights in extracted resources; rather, Article II only prevents claims of surface or sub-surface property rights.147 Another third of countries believe there can be private property rights in some instances and would, in any event,
find it less objectionable if done with proper “authorization” and
“continuing supervision” of the appropriate state party as required
by Article VI.148 Indeed, Secretary of State Vance and then-Legal
Adviser Owen put forth the U.S. interpretation in Congressional
hearings in 1979 that private property rights were allowed with respect to extracted resources.149 Congress recently passed legisla145 Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will
Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Space, Sci. & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 115th Cong. 10
(2017) (testimony of Matthew Schaefer, Co-Chair, American Branch of
International Law Assoc. Space Law Committee).
146 OST, supra note 16, Art. II.
147 See Letter from Schaefer and Hertzfeld to Congressional Leaders (May 15,
2015).
148 Id.
149 See Letter from Sec’y of State Vance to Sen. Church, Chairman of Senate
Foreign Rel. Comm., (Nov. 28, 1979), in Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
(Nov. 28, 1979), at 313 (stating that the Moon Treaty provides no moratorium on
exploitation of space resources, that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on
appropriation only applies to resources in place, and that the Outer Space Treaty
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tion signed into law by President Obama in November 2015 that
essentially codifies this long-standing interpretation by providing
the following:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of
an asteroid resource or a space resource . . . shall be entitled
to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the
United States.
It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment [of the
above provision], the United States does not thereby assert
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction
over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.150
Thus, Article II is no barrier to asteroid mining or the establishment of lunar facilities by U.S. entities. Even though property
rights in the surface or sub-surface of celestial bodies cannot be
claimed under Article II, and OST Article I mandates “free access
to all areas of celestial bodies,” Article IX of the OST does contain
some minimal obligations to help prevent mining or other operations from being interfered with by second-comers. Article IX requires “due regard” to be shown to other nations’ space activities
and also requires advance consultations if planning an activity that

and Moon Agreement would allow for ownership of extracted space resources);
see also Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the H. Comm. on Com.,
Sci. & Transp., 96th Cong. 2–19 (1980) (testimony of State Dept. Legal Advisor
Owen) (“American companies will have a continuing legal right to exploit the
Moon’s resources . . . . [O]nce [resources] have been extracted from the Moon,
ownership can be asserted . . . [and] exploitation [can] go forward and . . . one can
own what one can remove from the surface or subsurface of a celestial body . . .
. [T]he negotiating history [of the Moon Agreement] makes it very clear that that
was contemplated by the parties . . . . The United States took the position from the
outset that such exploitation should be permitted, that such ownership after
extraction
should
be
permitted. And
that . . . is
an
authoritative
interpretation . . . . [W]e have insisted that even after [an international] regime is
established [under the Moon Treaty], the right of unilateral exploitation will
continue to be available to those States which choose not to participate in such a
regime.”).
150 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, PUB. L. NO. 114-90,
129 STAT. 704, §§ 402(b), 403 (2015).
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“would cause potentially harmful interference” with another nation’s space activities.
Article IX’s consultation requirement arises where a secondcomer miner or establisher of a lunar facility seeks to conduct a
landing or engage in an activity too close to safely be accomplished
next to the first-comer’s mine or facility. Article IX provides that:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an
activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.
U.S. companies who are likely to be the first to engage in many
new activities, and thus likely to be first-arrivers or first-movers,
will certainly want the benefit of this obligation when it comes to
foreign entities’ actions as second-movers. Thus, it is important for
the U.S. government to follow through with its supervision obligations under Article VI for U.S. entities. The U.S. government cannot diplomatically push other countries to live up to their Article
VI obligations or other OST obligations if it does not have a plausible case to be made that it is living up to its own obligations.
Article IX also contains a two-way anti-contamination obligation. Specifically, it calls to “pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of
them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
The first antiappropriate measures for this purpose.”151
contamination obligation implicates on-orbit activities while the
latter deals with adverse changes to the environment of Earth. The
latter provision can already be addressed by the FAA under the
payload review of a licensed reentry because the FAA can take account of public safety in that context.152 Those advocating a pure
OST, supra note 16, art. IX (emphasis added).
See Laura Montgomery, supra note 111 (“The FAA’s payload review may
arguably prevent contamination to Earth–if not from Earth–because the FAA may
prevent a reentry if the reentry would jeopardize, among other things, public
health and safety.”).
151
152
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permissionless innovation-inspired interpretation of the OST, or in
other words, those who ignore the import of Art. VI of the OST, are
worried about the costs that might be associated with the application of anti-contamination or planetary protection norms to new
commercial space actors.153 They argue that planetary protection
standards set by COSPAR, a body of scientists,154 could involve
substantial compliance costs.155 However, COSPAR standards
concerning the Moon are quite limited.
More importantly,
COSPAR standards do not constitute “subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties” to the OST under Vienna
Convention Law of Treaty interpretation rules156 and thus do not
set a floor for planetary protection that must be followed by private parties. The State Department and other agencies rejected the
notion that COSPAR would set a floor during the Moon Express
payload review.157 The House Science Committee agreed, stating
153 Id. (“Although it is difficult to find information about the costs of
planetary protection, one expedition cost somewhere between $80 to $100 million
in 2003 dollars. People are full of microorganisms. I’m no biologist, but I think
there are far more than 300,000 bacterial spores on the surface of the human body,
never mind what’s inside us. Are we planning to prohibit people on Mars?
Probably not. I hope not.”).
154 See What We Do, COSPAR, https://www.icsu.org/what-we-do/researchprogrammes/thematic-organizations/committee-on-space-research-cospar
[https://perma.cc/YER5-YVXC] (explaining that COSPAR was established by
ICSU in 1958 as an interdisciplinary scientific body concerned with the
progress on an international scale of all kinds of scientific investigations
carried out with space vehicles, rockets and balloons).
155 See COSPAR’s Planetary Protection Policy, COSPAR (Oct. 20, 2002) amended
Mar.
24,
2005,
http://w.astro.berkeley.edu/~kalas/ethics/documents/environment/COSPAR
%20Planetary%20Protection%20Policy.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/TU3B-NRPT]
(detailing the planetary protection policy of COSPAR for the reference of
spacefaring nations).
156 VCLT, supra note 119, Art. 31(3)(b); see also U.N. General Assembly,
International Law Commission Report, ¶9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.833 (June 3, 2014)
(“1. An agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), requires a common
understanding regarding the interpretation of a treaty which the parties are aware
of and accept. Though it shall be taken into account, such an agreement need not
be legally binding. 2. The number of parties that must actively engage in
subsequent practice in order to establish an agreement under article 31, paragraph
3 (b), may vary. Silence on the part of one or more parties can constitute
acceptance of the subsequent practice when the circumstances call for some
reaction.”); see generally U.N. General Assembly, Second Report on Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, ¶56
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26, 2014).
157 Discussions at 9th Annual University of Nebraska D.C. Space Law
Conference (Oct. 2016).
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in the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, that
“[g]uidelines promulgated by [COSPAR] may not be considered
international obligations of the United States.”158 The U.S. government has flexibility to establish commercial-era norms with a
lower floor than those developed by COSPAR in a predominantly
science-oriented era.
In sum, the U.S. government, ensuring through authorization
and continuing supervision compliance by U.S. commercial companies with the few obligations that implicate commercial space
plans, will not significantly constrain nor impose significant costs
on U.S. commercial companies. Thus, the authorization and supervision regime established to comply with Article VI can be
“light touch,” or one that is still within the range of the continuum
that qualifies as in line with permissionless innovation thinking.
Below is a sample checklist the FAA or other agency might use to
ensure conformity with OST obligations by new on-orbit commercial applicants:
(1) Does the planned activity claim surface or sub-surface
rights on a celestial body or prevent free access to all areas of a celestial body, while keeping in mind legitimate
rights to be free from harmful interference?159
(2) Does the planned activity cause potentially harmful interference with foreign space activities?160
(3) Does the planned activity risk harmful contamination of
a celestial body with Earthly matter?161
(4) Is the applicant respecting ownership rights of a foreign
operator’s space object?162
One might want to add as a fifth element, whether the applicant is willing to discuss with the U.S. government allowing visits
from foreign states based on reciprocity to its stations and equipment with appropriate precautions to ensure safety and no interference with their operations. But it is an open question whether

American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3.
159 OST, supra note 16, arts. I, II, IX.
160 Id. at IX.
161 Id.
162 Id. at XIII (likely only relevant for space debris remediation).
158
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such a fifth element of the checklist, concerning visits to stations, is
required in light of the context as well as object and purpose of
OST Art. XII. That is why this fifth element is phrased simply as “if
the applicant is willing to discuss a visit” should such a request
arise. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. government should reimburse
a U.S. commercial actor for any costs associated with a visit, in the
unlikely event that one occur, after clearing all legal interpretation
and practical hurdles. One might add a sixth element, that the applicant is willing to take possible steps to assist astronauts in distress should a need arise, although this is likely to be impossible in
most circumstances.
The above list is not onerous, particularly when one realizes
that there is flexibility in how to define various terms, such as ‘potentially harmful interference’ and ‘harmful contamination.’ As
will be discussed later, the U.S. government can have the commercial space industry involved in setting the standards that define
those terms, provided such definitions do not stray from the ordinary meaning of those terms. To meet the continuing supervision
obligation, the U.S. can require applicants to report material
changes to operations or business plans and provide an annual report to the agency on its activities.
Proof of Propositions #3–5
Having established the U.S. government is required by its international obligations under the OST to ensure compliance with
treaty provisions by U.S. commercial actors through authorization
and continuing supervision and that any regulatory regime ensuring such compliance can be true to permissionless innovation
thinking by being light-touch in nature, we turn now to the following proof of propositions #3-5:
3) Congress made it clear in the legislative history to the
1998 amendments to U.S. commercial space legislation
that outside of FCC and NOAA licensing regimes for
spectrum use and remote sensing, respectively, it was
not granting authority to FAA or any other federal agency to regulate on-orbit activities; and
4) There are limits to how far the FAA can stretch or utilize
its existing payload review process to address on-orbit
activities; and
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5) Current FCC authority and NOAA authority does not allow the U.S. to ensure compliance by commercial actors
with the minimal OST obligations.
Proposition #3 is relatively straightforward. The FAA is perhaps hesitant to stretch the existing payload review process,
i.e., leverage its authority, too far into a wholesale regulation of onorbit activities, given the legislative history and Congressional intent surrounding the issue. House Committee Report 105-347, part
of the legislative history of the 1998 amendments to the commercial
space launch act that added “reentries” to FAA’s “launch” licensing authority, states:
The Committee wishes to make clear that the Secretary [of
Transportation] has no authority to license or regulate activities that take place between the end of the launch phase
and the beginning of the reentry phase, such as maneuvers
between two Earth orbits or other non-reentry operations in
Earth orbit; or after the end of a launch phase in the case of
missions where the payload is not a reentry vehicle.163
Recently, the Executive Branch leveraged its payload review
authority to satisfy its OST Art. VI obligations and approve a new
on-orbit space activity. In late July 2016, the FAA approved a payload review request by Moon Express of its MX-1E spacecraft/lander that is “capable of transfer from Earth orbit to the
Moon, making a soft landing on the lunar surface, and performing
post-landing relocations through propulsive ‘hops.”‘ However,
the Executive Branch was quick to caution that the approach may
not work in all or even a majority of future instances. Specifically,
the FAA release states:
For this particular mission and set of circumstances, the
FAA concludes, in concurrence with the Department of
State, that the enforcement of these representations [made
by Moon Express] constitutes compliance with Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty. This determination does not extend to future missions by Moon Express, Inc. or similar
missions from other entities. Any future requests for a payload determination from Moon Express, Inc. or another entity will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The FAA

163

H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997).
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made a favorable payload determination for this particular
mission, however, not all non-traditional space missions
may lend themselves to favorable payload determinations
under the payload review authority . . . . Future missions
may require additional authority to be provided to the FAA
to ensure conformity with the Outer Space Treaty. . . . In the
absence of legislative relief, the FAA will continue to work
with the commercial space industry to provide support for
non-traditional missions on a case-by-case basis when the
law permits.164
Apparently, the limited nature of Moon Express activities made
it possible to use the existing payload review process, but more sophisticated activities might cause more difficulties in using the existing payload review process. Moon Express volunteered to comply with COSPAR’s planetary protection guidelines and as
discussed above, those applicable to the Moon Express are quite
limited, involving only a reporting requirement. There is also
some question as to whether the FAA has authority to impose conditions or rather only give a thumbs up or thumbs down in a current payload review.165 The Obama Administration’s Mission Authorization framework, Rep. Bridenstine’s Enhanced Payload
Review determination, and the House Science Committee’s American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act all explicitly allow for a
‘yes,’ with conditions rather than simply approval or denial.
A year earlier, in 2015, the U.S. Executive Branch responded favorably to a Bigelow Aerospace payload review request to protect
Bigelow’s (future) orbital and lunar facilities from interfering operations. The FAA responded positively, indicating it would lever-

164 FAA, FAA Fact Sheet—Moon Express Payload Review Determination,
FAA
(Aug.
3,
2016),
https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20595
[https://perma.cc/3WG4-NYTH] (noting that the FAA accepted the application
and proceeded with review for a Payload Review and Determination on the MX1E spacecraft on April 21, 2016).
165 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Proposed Legislation Would Close Commercial Space
Regulatory Gap, SPACENEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://spacenews.com/proposedlegislation-would-close-commercial-space-regulatory-gap/
[https://perma.cc/YN4B-DHZK] (“A longer, more sophisticated mission, [State
Dept. Lawyer Brian] Israel suggested, might be harder to approve currently
without the ability to set conditions on a payload review. ‘Our lack of ability to
say ‘yes, but’ to prescribe conditions necessary for compliance with the treaty
would put U.S. in a bind,’ he said.”).
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age authority in response to Bigelow Aerospace’s payload review
request concerning the creation of zones of non-interference for its
space habitats. The FAA, in consultation with the State Department, Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, and other agencies,
declared that it will use its current launch licensing authority as
best as it can to protect space facilities, hardware, and personnel by
ensuring zones of non-interference with commercial operations.
However, the zones of non-interference will only apply vis-à-vis
others being licensed by FAA, mostly U.S. corporations. While
these decisions are a sign that FAA recognizes the importance of
protecting and stimulating private sector investments in new space
activities,166 the limits the FAA placed on leveraging existing payload review authority are a strong indication that such leveraging
will not fill the gap entirely.
Finally, some argue that there is no “gap” that needs to be
filled because the FCC licenses spectrum for use by a spacecraft
undertaking on-orbit activities and many of the spacecrafts going
to space are capable of sensing Earth and therefore need a NOAA
license too. Thus, according to this argument, the U.S. is authorizing and supervising its commercial actors’ on-orbit or in-space activities already. The problem here is that the FCC and NOAA lack
authority to take into account compliance with all OST obligations
in issuing licenses. For example, can NOAA and the FCC take into
account planetary protection issues flowing from OST Art. IX’s
harmful contamination (planetary protection) obligation when licensing a spacecraft under their respective laws and regulations?
With respect to NOAA, the answer is no it may not. 51 U.S.C.
§ 60121(a)(2) provides the following:
LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEM USED FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.—
In the case of a private space system that is used for remote
sensing and other purposes, the authority of the Secretary
under this subchapter shall be limited only to the remote
sensing operations of such space system.
166 See Matthew Schaefer, Assessing the U.S. House of Representatives’ SPACE
Act of 2015 (H.R. 2262) and the related U.S. Senate Bill (S. 1297), Part IV – Providing
for or Allocating On-Orbit (or In-Space) Jurisdiction, LAW OF SCHAEFER (Aug. 19,
2015), www.lawofschaefer.com/ [https://perma.cc/4U2S-MUNV] (arguing that
the legislative history of amendments to the Commercial Space Launch Act
indicates that Congress did not intend to allocate licensing authority to the FAA
for in-space or on-orbit activities).
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The FCC also lacks authority to ensure compliance with all
OST obligations. The FCC has taken into account foreign policy interests as part of its broader public interest analysis when assessing
whether a U.S. satellite can utilize a foreign ground station or a
foreign-registered satellite can provide service in the United
States.167 However, absent unusual facts, the FCC has not taken into account foreign policy interests in deciding on U.S. satellite spectrum applications; it would be breaking from tradition and practice
to do so.168 Moreover, the FCC jurisdiction is based on radio communications,169 thus any foreign policy considerations they can
take into account should likely be limited to foreign policy implications connected with the use of the radio spectrum, not, for example, the violation of unrelated OST obligations, such as harmful
contamination (planetary protection) obligations.
4.2. National Security Risk and Regulatory Uncertainty Risk
Every-day, non-illicit space activities have national security
implications. For example, debris created by pure accident can risk
making orbits unusable,170 and accidental interference with satellites or space operations may raise concerns given the difficulty in

167 See, e.g., FCC, Disco II Application (“In the DISCO II Order, the Commission
set forth the public interest analysis applicable in evaluating applications to use
non-U.S. licensed space stations to provide satellite service in the United States.
In conducting this analysis, we consider the effect on competition in the United
States, spectrum availability, eligibility requirements and operating (e.g.,
technical) requirements. In addition, we consider issues of national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy and trade policy, when those issues are brought to
our attention by the Executive Branch with regard to a particular application.
After consideration of these issues, we find that the public interest would be
served by a grant of USAsia Telecom[‘]s application.”).
168 See FCC, PETITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
ORGANIZATION UNDER SECTION 316 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, AS AMENDED, DA
07-4715, Nov. 23, 2007.
169 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–52 (2012) (establishing the FCC to regulate
communications by wire and radio).
170 See Tomasz Nowakowski, Space Debris Expert Warns about Dangers of Orbital Junk, PHYS.ORG, Jan. 12, 2015, https://phys.org/news/2015-01-space-debrisexpert-dangers-orbital.html
[https://perma.cc/U4KA-8G9Y]
(stressing
importance of international cooperation over the problem of floating space junk
and the multiple dangerous effects space junk may have on orbiting operational
spacecraft).
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establishing intent and attribution in space.171 Getting to space involves technology similar to an intercontinental ballistic missile.
The U.S. military operates its own satellites but also increasingly
leases transponders on commercial satellites.172 These satellites are
used for “nuclear command and control apparatus, military and
intelligence surveillance, and national security communications
and coordination.”173 No nation is more militarily reliant on space
assets than the United States.174 Interference with those assets is,
and will remain, a national security concern.175 It is implausible for
the U.S. government to give carte blanche approval to activities in
outer space without at least minimal national security review. Indeed, the Executive Branch would face strong temptations to lev-

171 See Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation, Remarks to the George C. Marshall Institute Roundtable at
the National Press Club (as prepared) ,March 4, 2008, https://20012009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/101711.htm
[https://perma.cc/N6EM-3SK5
]
(“Clearly, the fact that a space object has been destroyed, or has sustained damage
or injury, or that its parameters have been altered is detectable with high
confidence by the satellite owner and, in some instances, by the National
Technical Means (NTM) of other states. The attribution of such an action to
another state may be possible with high confidence in the case of a direct intercept
or of a collision with an object known to belong to that other state. However,
identification (as an attack) may not be possible if the other state denies that its
action was deliberate. Further, identification (as an attack) and/or attribution (to a
state) may not be possible in other instances—e.g., if there were no observable
intercept or collision, as in the case of a remote, covert telemetric attack on the
software of the object’s operating system or if the damage were caused by ‘space
debris.’ Attribution also could be a challenge with certain types of launches, e.g.,
from locations at sea.”).
172 See Timothy M. Bonds & Isaac R. Porche III, Satellites for Rent, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/11/07/limiting-the-pentagons-reliance-on-commercial-satellites.
[https://perma.cc/H5CX-ASWK] (describing different models of satellites
utilized by the U.S. government, and proposing other leasing strategies that could
increase and diversify supply).
173 See JOSHUA HAMPSON, THE FUTURE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION, NISKANEN
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://niskanencenter.org/wpCENTER
content/uploads/2017/01/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5LB-899E].
174 See Omar Lamrani, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,
THE NAT’L INT. (May 18, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/whatthe-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248
[https://perma.cc/5NYTCA36 ] (“For the United States, being the leader in military space technologies
provides immense advantages. At the same time, its outsized reliance on those
technologies entails risks. The current unequal dependence on space, the United
States fears, could give adversaries incentive to attack its infrastructure in orbit.”).
175 Id.
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erage its existing payload review authority to prevent any on-orbit
activities that threaten national security.176 Industry acknowledges
this dynamic. Businesses focused on new activities do not want a
dysfunctional process that delays deployment of new technologies
or decisions based on outdated benefit-cost analysis, even with regards to national security interests. They do, however, understand
that a pure permissionless innovation model is simply impracticable in the outer space domain. Indeed, at its October 2016 meeting,
COMSTAC made the following finding and recommendation:
The COMSTAC finds that the current lack of an explicit, defined process for commercial space activities that are not
currently explicitly supervised by a U.S. Government
Agency has resulted in a lack of stability, predictability,
transparency, and efficiency, which has and will continue
to hinder the development of domestic commercial space
operations.
RECOMMENDATION:
COMSTAC recommends that, in meetings and discussions
with policymakers, regardless of the ultimate approach
taken to meet the nation’s international treaty obligations,
the U.S. Government should take expeditious action to enable a safe, predictable, and conducive environment for the
growth of commercial space operations and activities . . . .177
Fortunately, U.S. national security interests connected with
many of the expected new activities—such as on-orbit and lunar
habitats and research labs, and asteroid and space resource min-

176 See, e.g. Regulating Space: Innovation, Liberty, and International Obligations
hearing before the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Science, 115th
Cong. (March 8, 2017) (statement of Doug Loverro, Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary
of
Defense
for
Space
Policy)
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/SY16/20170308/105659/HHRG-115-SY16Wstate-LoverroD-20170308.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE2Y-B48B] (presenting an
example of collaboration between private sector and Executive Branch to
eliminate a program’s national security risks).
177 COMSTAC proposed OFR’s, (Oct. 26, 2016) (on file with author);
(adoption confirmed by and available at Marcia Smith, Bridenstine: This is Our
Sputnik Moment & The Moon Will Ensure U.S. Preeminence in Space,
SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM
(
November
3,
2016
12:43
am
ET),
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/bridenstine-this-is-our-sputnikmoment-the-moon-will-ensure-u-s-preeminence-in-space
[https://perma.cc/GX47-HR57]).
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ing—align with its commercial interests. U.S. national security is
generally enhanced if U.S. commercial companies are leaders in
these industries rather than second-movers. On-orbit satellite servicing or active debris remediation technologies—because the
technology can be adapted for satellite weaponry—is a closer call.
But even here if the technology is to come to market, it is far better
for U.S. national security if it is the U.S. industry to lead the development of the technology rather than foreign countries. If Congress does not enact a transparent and stable process, then the Executive Branch will always face temptations to leverage existing
authorities and commercial space businesses will be left wondering
if activities will be blocked or limited by the government at the last
minute or after significant investment in time and money. Thus, in
addition to limiting the international obligation risk, a “light
touch” authorization and supervision process can diminish both
national security risk for the government as well as regulatory uncertainty risk for the commercial space industry.
5. EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO CURE
THE ON-ORBIT REGULATORY GAP
The benefits of Congress filling the on-orbit regulatory gap are
numerous. First, it will ensure that the United States can meet its
international obligations under Article VI of the OST. Meeting our
international obligations will lessen opposition and diplomatic
complaints among some countries to controversial activities such
as asteroid mining. Correspondingly, it will prevent actions by
foreign governments against foreign partners cooperating with, or
foreign customers purchasing from, U.S. commercial space businesses engaged in on-orbit activities. Second, it will also ensure
that U.S. national security concerns will be addressed in a more
certain and predictable manner. Third, it can provide regulatory
certainty to space industry investors. However, doing so does not
require Congress to abandon pursuit of permissionless innovation
thinking. Congress, in filling the gap, should also seek to maximize permissionless innovation thinking within the on-orbit regulatory framework it creates, as well as help advance a permissionless
innovation esprit de corps in the inter-agency process considering
applications.
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Three proposals to cure the gap have been advanced in the past
two years: (i) the Obama Administration’s Mission Authorization
proposal of April 4, 2016 (delineated in a report required by Section 108 of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act of 2015), (ii)
Representative Bridenstine’s American Space Renaissance Act bill’s
proposal for an enhanced payload review process for after deployment activities of payloads, and (iii) the 2017 House Science Committee’s American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill calling
for a certification process. The three proposals are examined below
along with options for improving the permissionless innovation
quotient in each, or alternatively, in the case of the third proposal,
ensuring its proposed certification process sufficiently addresses
international obligation and national security risk factors that can
undermine the benefits of permissionless innovation.
5.1. The Executive Branch’s Proposed Mission Authorization
Framework of April 4, 2016
In November 2015, President Obama signed into law the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. The law in
Section 108 contains a reporting requirement for the Executive
Branch (Director of OSTP) to address the on-orbit authority issue,
namely to undertake the following:
(1) assess current, and proposed near-term, commercial
non-governmental activities conducted in space;
(2) identify appropriate authorization and supervision authorities for the activities described in paragraph (1);
(3) recommend an authorization and supervision approach
that would prioritize safety, utilize existing authorities,
minimize burdens to the industry, promote the U.S.
commercial space sector, and meet the United States obligations under international treaties . . . .178
Section 108 adopted the Senate bill’s language over that of the
House bill. The House bill would have only required an examination of on-orbit authority in the context of space resource and as-

178

U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90.
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teroid resource extraction activities.179 As noted above, asteroid
mining is only one of many future on-orbit activities. The Senate
bill focused, as did the final law, on current and “near-term” new
activities180 without defining what “near-term” means (i.e., three
years? Five years? Ten years? Or more?).
Most space companies and investors want certainty as to the
on-orbit licensing processes sooner rather than later. However, a
few may wish for a delay to prevent any risk of adoption of an inappropriate or overly complex framework, created without benefit
of first seeing the activities that come to market. Skeptics of immediate legislative fixes indicate that there is always a possibility of
continuing to modestly stretch current authorities for some activities that creep up earlier than expected. Government agencies, particularly the U.S. State Department, wish to have a framework in
place sooner rather than later in order to minimize any diplomatic
complaints, particularly over activities such as asteroid mining.
The U.S. framework could possibly serve as a model for other nations while also ensuring compliance with U.S. international obligations. There are hints of this tension in Section 108’s requiring a
report by the Executive Branch and seemingly wanting to push the
process along sooner but with the focus placed on current and
“near-term” activities, suggesting some sympathy to treading more
slowly as activities occur.
The report required by Section 108 of the U.S. Commercial
Space Launch Competitiveness Act was released by White
House/OSTP on April 4, 2016.181 The report does not draw a
bright line for what constitutes “near-term” activities, but does
mention activities that might occur within one year as well as activities that might “not begin for a decade or more.”182 The three
categories of activities addressed in the report are: (i) private missions beyond Earth Orbit (e.g., commercial missions to the Moon or
Mars and commercial lunar habitat), (ii) new on-orbit activities
(e.g., on-orbit satellite servicing, including repair and refueling,
and commercial orbital habitats), and (iii) space resource utilization (e.g., extracting/mining resources from asteroids or the
Moon).183 The report states that the U.S. government has imple179
180
181
182
183

H.R. Res. 2262, § 402 114th Cong. (2015).
S. Res. 1297, § 7 114th Cong. (2015).
Holdren, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
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mented its OST Article VI obligations to “authorize” and “continually supervise” through licensing conditions with separate
frameworks for launch/reentry, remote sensing, and communications adding that these existing frameworks do not “provide clear
avenues through which the U.S. government can fulfill its Art. VI
obligations in relation to the newly contemplated commercial
space activities.”184
The report highlighted the desire, by many companies, for a
“clear and predictable oversight process that ensures access to
space and imposes minimal burdens on the industry.”185 Accordingly, the report made a suggestion for such an oversight process,
called the “Mission Authorization” proposal.
Modeled on the payload review process of the FAA, the April
4, 2016 OSTP report recommends a new “Mission Authorization”
framework and states a belief that legislation creating such a
framework “would encourage investment in [new space] activities . . . .”186 The Mission Authorization proposal is similar to the
FAA’s payload review process in that the FAA would coordinate
an inter-agency process on a case-by-case basis. The proposal does
not authorize any agency to adopt substantive, generally applicable regulations.187 The Mission Authorization proposal defines
“mission” to involve “the operation of a space object, with or without human occupants, in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,”188 but explicitly excludes those activities requiring an FCC or NOAA license.
One further benefit of establishing the Mission Authorization
proposal, according to the report, is that the current payload review process only applies to payloads launched from the United
States, whereas the Mission Authorization proposal would apply
to U.S. nationals regardless of launch location. As such, it would
eliminate any potential disincentive for U.S. nationals to launch
from foreign countries.189 Another benefit is that it would open the
door to “yes, but . . . ” answers in response to requests for authorization as, according to some government officials, the current pay-

184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. app. at 6-7.
Id. at 4–5.
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load review process does not allow for any conditions.190 Under
the proposal, conditions can be placed on mission authorizations if
“deem[ed] necessary for compliance with United States international obligations, preservation of the foreign policy interests and
national security of the United States, and protection of United
States government uses of outer space.”191
5.2. Rep. Bridenstine’s American Space Renaissance Act Bill’s (H.R.
4945) Enhanced Payload Review
In April 2016, Representative Bridenstine from Oklahoma released H.R. 4945, or the “American Space Renaissance Act,” without formally introducing it.192 The bill states the sense of Congress
that existing law is sufficient authority for the U.S. to meet its international obligations under the OST.193 However, it proceeds to
call on the DOT (specifically, a newly created Assistant Secretary
for Commercial Space Transportation) to issue regulations “as are
necessary to provide for enhanced review and determination process for payloads and associated activities after deployment,” pursuant to a launch license.194 The bill also calls for enhanced coordination and participation of DOT with other agencies, specifically
including the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, NASA, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.195
Section 309 of the Bridenstine bill appears to be responsive to at
least some of Chairman Babin’s concerns regarding the Mission
Authorization proposal, specifically Chairman Babin’s concern that
the on-orbit approval process will face the same pitfalls as the
190 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Proposed Legislation Would Close Commercial Space
Regulatory Gap, SPACENEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://spacenews.com/proposedlegislation-would-close-commercial-space-regulatory-gap/
[https://perma.cc/9VXY-QNP7]).(“A longer, more sophisticated mission, [State
Dept. lawyer Brian] Israel suggested, might be harder to approve currently
without the ability to set considerations on a payload review. ‘Our lack of ability
to say ‘yes, but. . .’ to prescribe conditions necessary for compliance with the
treaty would put the U.S. in a bind,’ he said.”).
191 Holdren Letter, supra note 19, app. at 6-7.
192 H.R. Res. 4945, 114th Cong. (2016).
193 Id. § 309(a)(1).
194 Id. § 309(a)(2).
195 Id. § 309(a)(2)(B).
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NOAA process for remote sensing, including lengthy delays.
Thus, under Rep. Bridenstine’s bill, determinations are required
within sixty days of submission, by the payload owner or operator,
of information sufficient to make an enhanced review and determination. If sixty days pass without a determination, approval is
deemed to have occurred.196 Conditions may be imposed to ensure
consistency with U.S. treaty obligations, protection of U.S. national
security, prevention of harmful interference with already approved
activities, and protection of historic artifacts.197 If DOT denies a license due to a payload and its associated activities, it must provide
the owner or operator with a clearly articulate rationale so that
they can attempt to remedy any defect.198
5.3. House Science Committee’s American Space Commerce Free
Enterprise Act Bill (H.R. 2809) of June 2017
The House Science Committee approved and reported out of
committee H.R. 2809 on June 8, 2017.199 The bill seeks to establish a
certification regime for new on-orbit space activities. The Secretary
of Commerce, rather than the FAA, is empowered by the bill to issue certificates to applicants that meet the requirements outlined in
the bill.200 In essence, applicants have to describe the proposed operations of their space object (where and when it will operate) and
attest that they are not carrying any WMD or testing weapons on
celestial bodies (that is, not violating OST Art. IV).201 The Secretary
of Commerce “shall as he determines necessary” consult with other agencies on the application.202 Thus, an interagency discussion is

Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(i).
Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(ii).
198 Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(iii).
199 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act Bill, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 (amending Title 51 of the United States Code to
provide for the authorization and supervision of nongovernmental space
activities).
200 See id at § 3 (focusing on authorization and supervision of issuing
certificates to operate space objects).
201 Id.
202 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY, AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2809
OFFERED
BY
M R.
SMITH
OF
TEXAS,
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents
196
197
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not absolutely required, although even weaker language utilizing
the word “may” was in the bill originally and strengthened to
“shall” after an amendment at the bill’s mark-up by the committee.203 If the Secretary of Commerce exceeds the time deadline for
decision, the certification is considered approved without condition.204 The Secretary of Commerce can condition or deny an application for a certification if the Secretary cannot verify information in the application or if the Secretary determines with clear
and convincing evidence that the activity would violate an international obligation of the United States under the OST.205 However,
as noted earlier, in making that determination, the Secretary is
supposed to interpret the OST in a minimally burdensome way,
but without any acknowledgement of Vienna Convention treaty
interpretation rules, nor the State Department’s traditional role in
administering treaty interpretation of the OST.206 Indeed, under
the statute, only the Secretary of Commerce is allowed to make
findings regarding OST obligations in the case of U.S. commercial
actors’ new space activities.207 There is no specific mention of any
other criteria the Secretary can take into account in conditioning or
denying a certification—no specific national security criteria exists.208 There is a provision in the statute addressing a situation in
which a certification holder’s space operations pose a threat to the
physical safety of an American government asset.209 However, in
such a situation, the Secretary is only entitled to hold a consultation between the affected parties and report the results to Congress, but the Secretary is not empowered to impose conditions on
operations as a result of the consultation.210

/SMITTX_012_xml.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLE5-W8GG] (adopted at Committee
Mark-Up by voice vote).
203 Id.
204 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at §3.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at § 5.
208 Id. at § 3.
209 Id. at § 5.
210 Id.
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6. WHEN CONGRESS ACTS TO CURE THE ON-ORBIT REGULATORY
GAP, HOW CAN IT MAXIMIZE PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION
THINKING AND PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION ESPRIT DE CORPS
WITHIN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS, WHILE ENSURING
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION RISK AND NATIONAL SECURITY RISK
ARE SUFFICIENTLY MINIMIZED?
Worries exist that the interagency process created by a Mission
Authorization Framework or an Enhanced Payload Review Process
will lead to lengthy delays in approval or authorization or lead to
overly burdensome regulation. This does not appear to be the intent of those proposing or supporting cures to the on-orbit regulatory gap, and so the question arises what provisions can be injected
as “friendly amendments” to limit an overly-restrictive or burdensome process on the commercial space industry. Additionally, the
question arises as to what suggestions for change to these approaches should be avoided. However, the Certification Process
laid out by the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill
raises the opposite concern: whether its desire for permissionless
innovation thinking goes too far, thereby creating international obligation risk as well as national security risk issues that undermine
the ultimate benefits of permissionless innovation.
6.1. Features That Should be Adopted in any Proposal to Cure the
Regulatory Gap for New On-Orbit Space Activities

6.1.1. Creating a Default Presumption in Favor of Approval.
Key to permissionless innovation thinking is the establishment
of a policy default of approval of the development and deployment
of new technologies. In an attempt to ensure that decisions are
reached in a timely fashion and create a default rule in favor of approval, Rep. Bridenstine’s bill attempts to use a “deemed authorized” provision. That is, if no decision on an on-orbit activity application is given within set number of days, then the applicant’s
activities are “deemed authorized.”211 The American Space Com-

211

H.R. Res. 4945, supra note 186, § 309(a)(2)(C)(i).
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merce Free Enterprise Act bill also contains a similar provision.212
The problem with a “deemed authorized” provision, while it is
consistent with the default of approval in permissionless innovation thinking, is that it may simply lead to a “no” answer if no decision has been reached within the time window provided. That
answer will be given to avoid having the activity be deemed authorized. In other words, a “deemed authorized” provision can
backfire and essentially lead to a default of no permission. Instead,
any law granting Executive Branch authority should simply declare a presumption in favor of approval.
Indeed, Congress could even go further and create a “foreseeable harm” requirement. The requirement would mandate the
agency to find “foreseeable harm” to one of the listed interests/factors the agency is to consider in authorization decisions.
Such a requirement can act to avoid precautionary principle thinking seeping into the process. Congress recently employed a foreseeable harm requirement in the context of improvements to FOIA
to buttress presumptions in favor of release of information, so it is
a tool with which Congress is familiar.213 The American Space
Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill employs a “clear and convincing” evidence standard for international obligation violations that
can also assist a presumption in favor of allowing activities.214
However, use of this evidentiary standard raises the risk of a litigation-centric approach, and there is no absolute certainty that it is
the standard that would be employed internationally for violations.215 Moreover, the evidentiary standard does not work as well
for a national security criterion, but of course, such a criterion is
absent in the bill, as we will see below.

212

§3.

American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, supra note 80, at

213 See FOIA IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2015, S. REP. 114-4, (2015) (reviewing the
FOIA Improvement Act’s of 2015 background, purpose, history, and regulatory
impact evaluation, and recommending passage of the bill).
214 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80, at §3.
215 For example, the International Court of Justice has not made clear what
standard of proof they would employ for a state responsibility issue, although
there is some support for the clear and convincing evidence standard. See, e.g.,
Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for Cyber Operations, 50 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 234, 248-51 (2015) (examining possible
methods and standards of proof in the context of international cyber operations).
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6.1.2. Limiting Factors that Can be Considered by the Executive
Branch but Not So Much as to Create International Obligation
Risk, National Security Risk or Interference with Operations
Risk.
The Mission Authorization Framework proposed by the
Obama administration bans the issuance of substantive regulations. Instead, there is an ex ante interagency process established
that will consider four factors: (i) compliance with international obligations, (ii) U.S. national security interests, (iii) U.S. foreign policy
interests, and (iv) protection of U.S. government uses of outer
space.
Rep. Bridenstine’s bill contains a similar set of factors to consider but with some differences. Bridenstine’s four factors include,
like the Obama Administration’s Mission Authorization framework, compliance with international obligations and U.S. national
security interests. However, Bridenstine’s four factors do not include foreign policy interests, nor protection of U.S. government
uses of outer space. Dropping these two probably helps favor
permissionless innovation thinking. Dropping foreign policy interests as a factor limits discretion to disapprove new space activities. Foreign policy interests are a broader potential limit than
compliance with international obligations and national security interests, both of which might be considered to encompass a subset
of all foreign policy interests. Eliminating protection of U.S. government uses of outer space as a criterion is consistent with Congressional calls to utilize commercial services to the maximum extent,216 and in any event, the national security factor already
adequately protects national security assets and activities.
Rep. Bridenstine’s approach has the following additional factors included: the activity must “not result in harmful interference
with approved and operating payloads and associated activities,”
and must “not harm historic artifacts.”217 The first additional factor is necessary to protect U.S. commercial first movers from interference from U.S. commercial second-movers. Compliance with
international obligations only deals with interference between U.S.
companies and foreign entities. The second additional factor is
fairly narrow—likely referring to Tranquility Base, the location on
216
217

51 U.S.C. § 50901 (2012).
H.R. Res. 4945, supra note 186, § 309(a)(2)(C)(ii).
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the Moon where Neil Armstong’s footprints still reside, as do other
similar artifacts, and would only implicate activities on the Moon
in any event.218 Rep. Bridenstine’s list of factors, being a bit narrower, appears to be more friendly to permissionless innovation
than those in the Mission Authorization Framework.
The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill basically limits its criteria to international obligations, with numerous
limitations on how those international obligations can be interpreted and a high standard (clear and convincing) for proving their violation.219 It almost appears that, except for those OST Art. IV obligations related to WMD and weapons testing, the bill is making it
difficult to consider other minimally burdensome OST obligations
laid out in the checklist earlier in this article. Yet, arguably somewhat inconsistently, the marked-up bill calls on the President to
protect U.S. entities from harmful interference, protect ownership
interests of U.S. entities’ space objects, and ensure that U.S. entities
operations are given due regard.220 In other words, it calls on the
President to protect OST Art. VIII and IX rights of U.S. entities
without requiring the President to ensure that threats to these
rights are proven by clear and convincing evidence. The bill, as
worded, thus creates a risk that foreign countries may view the
U.S. as not respecting their OST rights to the same degree the U.S.
is expecting its OST rights to be respected, and consequently raises
the prospect of foreign retaliation.
The bill also does not contain any general national security criteria, and only allows for a consultation and report to Congress on
such consultation, should the commercial activity threaten the
physical safety of a U.S. government space asset. The bill thus
might have narrowed the criteria for approval too much. It creates
a risk of the U.S. government potentially stepping in to block an ac218 See, e.g., Michael Milstein, NASA Looks to Protect Historic Sites on the Moon,
(June
2008),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/scienceSMITHSONIAN
nature/nasa-looks-to-protect-historic-sites-on-the-moon-47186092
[https://perma.cc/3E4A-XZR6] (discussing NASA’s guidelines to protect historic
lunar landmarks and high importance of international norms governing lunar
archaeology); see also Alice Gorman, Look, But Don’t Touch: U.S. Law and the Protection of Lunar Heritage, SPACE.COM (Dec. 6, 2013, http://www.space.com/23860look-but-dont-touch-us-law-and-the-protection-of-lunar-heritage.html
[https://perma.cc/79M9-EQMC] (stressing urgency of adequate Moon heritage
protection).
219 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80, at §§ 3, 5.
220 Id.
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tivity and overstretching authorities in case of a rare but significant
national security issue being raised. The risks of foreign retaliation
or last-minute blockages by the federal government potentially
undermine the purported benefits of a (too) pure permissionless
innovation regime.
Furthermore, the bill does not include interference with the activities of an already approved U.S. commercial space object as a
criterion. There is some concern that some entities might attempt
to use non-interference rights to “space squat” and block potential
competitors from certain areas or regions. Indeed, the bill declares
that the Secretary of Commerce “may not deny an application for a
certification. . .in order to protect an existing certification holder
from competition.”221 This is good policy in isolation, but any solution to the regulatory gap must also account for true cases of interference with pre-existing U.S. commercial operations.
6.1.3. Enhancing the Default Presumption by Explicitly Declaring
U.S. Leadership in Specific New Activities is in the National
Security Interest of the United States.
At first glance, national security concerns could potentially be
the greater obstacle to a favorable decision, compared to international obligation concerns. This is due to the limited nature of OST
obligations that might apply to commercial activities. However,
many of the new space activities most likely to occur in the near future will probably cause less of a national security concern than
appears in the remote sensing context. As a general matter, it is in
the U.S.’s national security interests to have U.S. companies be the
first to engage in asteroid or lunar mining, and to establish private
research labs or hotels in-orbit or on the Moon. Thus, the interagency process should be designed to act promptly on such applications. The new activities of on-orbit satellite servicing or debris
removal may contain more competing national security arguments.
It stems from the fact that if operations go wrong, they may endanger national security assets by creating additional debris or
move debris into a more populated orbit. On balance, since some
of the technology is akin to satellite weaponry, it is still in the U.S.
interest if such activities are born by and engaged in by U.S. com221

Id.
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mercial entities first. Congress could declare that U.S. leadership
in these activities by U.S. commercial companies is in the national
security interest. This will prevent national security criteria for
approval from being utilized to limit commercial operations, except in very rare and essential cases, such as when the commercial
operation might harmfully interfere with an existing critical U.S.
government space asset. The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill contains such a declaration,222 and thus it should
not fail to contain any national security criteria, or at least contain a
bit more robust authority to protect federal government space assets from harmful interference, for a rare instance in which the new
activities raise such concerns.
6.1.4. Granting Lead Interagency Status to an Agency Directed to
Promote Industry
Both the Executive Branch’s proposed Mission Authorization
Framework and Rep. Bridenstine’s proposed bill would entrust the
FAA (or in the case of the Bridenstine bill, a newly created position
of an Assistant Secretary for Commercial Space within the DOT)
with leading the interagency process for reviewing missions and
payloads, as well as issuing final decisions on applications. Since
the FAA has authority to “encourage, facilitate and promote” the
commercial space industry, placing the FAA in the interagency
lead may help establish a permissionless innovation esprit de corps
within the interagency process. In contrast, NOAA—the lead
agency for remote sensing decisions—is not charged with promoting the industry. Having an agency with promotion authority lead
the interagency process can help ensure that the benefits (including
national security benefits) of an activity are fully considered. It can
also help ensure consideration of the potential foreign competition
that might seek to benefit from less stringent authorization processes abroad. Additionally, “if an agency that has experience in
licensing is given the lead authority this will help reduce transac-

222 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809,
115th Cong. (2017) supra note 80, at § 2(5) (“The private exploration and use of
outer space by nongovernmental entities will further the national security, foreign
policy, and economic interests of the United States.”).
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tion costs and avoid possible duplication in processes.”223 Thus,
the FAA is likely the best candidate to be the lead agency because
it has both promotion authority and experience in licensing and inter-agency coordination in commercial space matters. The problem
with the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill’s attempt to place authority over new in–orbit space activities in the
Department of Commerce and not absolutely requiring an interagency process, is several–fold. If such authority is given to another agency, duplication may result, as FAA–AST will still conduct a
payload review, separately or as part of a launch license. Given
the State Department’s lead role in treaty interpretation and international consultations on space matters, and DOD’s knowledge of
critical national security space assets, it is important that on-orbit
licensing remain an interagency process. Hence, “[s]imply adding
an on-orbit component to the existing payload review, along with
the other suggestions made in these eight principles, may be the
least costly and least disruptive solution to solving the on-orbit authorization gap.”224
6.1.5. Establish Deadlines with Executive Branch Notification and
Reporting Requirements to Congress.
In order to put some teeth, or at least pressure, behind statutory deadlines, and prevent years-long delays of the kind that occurred in NOAA remote sensing licensing processes, Congress can
place significant notification and reporting requirements on the
Executive Branch in any delegation of on-orbit authority to the Executive Branch. For example, Congress could require immediate
notification to the House Science and Senate Commerce Space Subcommittees when the deadline for a decision has passed. It can also require semi-annual reports on mission authorization (or enhanced payload review) applications and decisions, as well as on
any foreign on-orbit activities and foreign licensing procedures.
Such notification and reporting requirements may place subtle
pressure on the Executive Branch to ensure timely decisions are
223 Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will
Impact before the Subcomm, on Space, Science and Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Matthew P. Schaefer,
American Branch of International Law Assoc. Space Law Committee).
224 Id. at 14.
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made, while also ensuring that they are keeping track of any foreign competitive pressures.
6.1.6. Establish an Ombuds as well as Possible Appeal Avenues to
the President or Vice–President in Cases of Denial.
Congress might even consider creating an ombuds225 with a top
security clearance that is able to intervene in cases in which decisions are delayed, or rationales for decisions are not fully explained
or cannot be explained due to lack of proper security clearances by
applicant company officials. On numerous occasions executive
ombuds, that take complaints regarding agency action, have been
created by means of Congressional statutes. In fact, there are so
many ombuds that a Coalition of Federal Ombuds has been created.226 Congress can also add the option of an appeal to a higher
authority, such as the Vice President-led Space Council, recently
re-created under the Trump Administration,227 or the President, in
situations where the ombuds working with the interagency process
and the company have not reached a satisfactory resolution.
6.1.7. Limit Chances for Regulatory Arbitrage and “Flags of
Convenience” to Help Ensure Innovation Occurs in the United
States.
The space business is global and, in establishing any regulatory
regime, the U.S. must be sensitive to avoid regulating in a manner
that encourages the outflow of innovative space businesses to other
spacefaring countries. International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regula225 See
Coalition
of
Federal
Ombudsman,
(Aug.
27,
2012),
http://federalombuds.ed.gov/federalombuds/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2017) [https://perma.cc/7WAC-NBA6] (explaining the purpose and resources
provided by the Coalition of Federal Ombudsman, which facilitates ombuds
serving United States government agencies).
226 See id. (detailing the goals and services offered by the Coalition of Federal
Ombuds to assist ombuds).
227 See Exec. Order No. 13803, 82 Fed. Reg. 31429 (June 30, 2017); see also
Leonard David, Playing the Space Trump Card: Relaunching a National Space Council,
SPACE (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.space.com/35163-trump-administrationnational-space-council.html [https://perma.cc/G733-9LJG] (examining potential
usefulness of President Trump’s idea of re-launching the National Space Council).
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tions, even after substantial reform in the past several years, help
prevent outsourcing to some degree. However, given the importance of the space industry to national security and national
economic interests of the United States, policy-makers still must be
sensitive to this concern.228 In recognition of other countries’ actions, as well as space industries benefitting from similar frameworks at least as favorable as the U.S. one, Congress just recently
showed its concern for possible regulatory arbitrage among those
seeking to access space. In 2015, it passed a long-term (ten-year)
extension of the promise of government indemnification for third
party damages, above the amount of insurance required to be purchased by launch licensees to place U.S. industry on roughly equal
footing with foreign launch companies that benefit from thirdparty liability caps enacted by their governments.229 Thus, when
filling the on-orbit regulatory gap, Congress might now require the
interagency process led by the FAA to consider in its decision–
making the global nature of the industry, and the goal of not placing U.S. commercial space entities at a competitive disadvantage
when compared to the regulatory frameworks and authorization
processes adopted by foreign countries. The Congressional committee reports on any legislation can detail the very limited nature
of the obligations in the OST that might apply to commercial space
activities, laying out the checklist developed earlier in this article.230 The law itself might also direct the President to ensure,
through negotiation and consultation, that foreign countries are also meeting the same minimum standards—e.g., not creating “flags
of convenience”231 to attract the space industry. Congress might
even consider ensuring that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
(even those relying on foreign launch vehicles) receive U.S. authorization for their activities. This latter provision would mean that
Congress would choose the Mission Authorization Framework apSchaefer, supra note 45, at 225–27.
Id. at 232–233.
230 Id. at 36.
231 See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Towards Flags of Convenience in Space?,
(Univ.
of
Neb.)
(2012),
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=spac
elaw [https://perma.cc/5PFK-6AYF] (noting that, in the space context, “from the
mere fact that national laws and licensing regimes are different it can not
automatically be concluded that there is a risk in practice for ‘flags of
convenience’ in outer space to become a real problem, so as to require or justify
substantial efforts to deal with it for example at the UN level.”).
228
229
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proach to this issue rather than following Rep. Bridenstine’s Enhanced Payload Review, as the payload reviews only occur for
payloads using U.S. launch vehicles.
6.1.8. Have the U.S. Government Both Encourage and Give
Substantial Deference to Industry Standards.
House Science Committee Space Subcommittee Chairman, Rep.
Babin, recently proposed turning to “standards-setting bodies” and
“self-regulating organizations” as alternatives to an authorize and
supervise framework.232 However, these approaches cannot be alternatives to an authorize and supervise framework while also
maintaining consistency with OST Art. VI. That is because Art. VI
requires the government to be the one authorizing and supervising. Yet, the spirit of Chairman Babin’s proposal is achievable,
since there is no prohibition on the U.S. government deferring to
industry-set standards, and standards of self-regulating organizations, in determining whether to authorize an activity. For example, COSPAR has planetary protection standards. For a number of
reasons, these standards, created and followed in a scienceinspired coalition of governments and scientists, do not create a
floor for what constitutes harmful contamination under the OST.233
The U.S. government recognizes that COSPAR standards do not
constitute “subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the
parties” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties interpretation rules. Therefore, the U.S. government need not follow
these standards in authorizing on-orbit activities.234 Instead, the
U.S. government has the flexibility to set its own planetary protection standards in a commercial environment, or to follow industryset standards. Congress recently has promoted industry standards
over safety matters by requiring periodic reports from the FAA in
consultation with industry on such matters every thirty months.235
Congress could similarly push the FAA to promote industry
standards on matters related to ensuring compliance with OST obligations by private parties—specifically non-interference and

232
233
234
235

Babin, supra note 2 at 5.
Supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
Id.
Public Law No. 114–90, supra note 178.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/4

2017]

Contours of Permissionless Innovation

177

harmful contamination (planetary protection) standards. Indeed,
the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill calls for the
establishment of a private sector advisory committee to examine,
among others, harmful interference and harmful contamination issues.236 Of course, there could be some hurdles to industry establishing standards, such as concerns about releasing proprietary information to potential competitors, but nevertheless there should
be mechanisms and processes that allow for standards that are
greatly informed by industry such that the standards are friendly
to commercial activity.
6.2. Two Approaches that Should Be Avoided
Other suggestions have been made by current and former government officials to limit the extent of Executive authority over onorbit activities. However, the drawbacks of these suggestions
outweigh their benefits and should be avoided in any legislative
solution.
6.2.1. Listing Specific Activities that Require Authorization or
Giving Blanket Statutory Authorizations to Certain Activities.
A former DOT/FAA official suggested listing specific activities
that require authorization.237 The former official argues that specific listing is necessary so as not to run afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine or the Due Process Clause.238 However, the Constitutional arguments made in favor of listing specific
activities are inaccurate. First, the non-delegation doctrine is a
236 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809,
115th Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3.
237 See Montgomery, supra note 124 (discussing the United States compliance
with the Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty); see also Montgomery, supra note 105
(discussing application of the Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to the private
sector).
238 See Laura Montgomery, Comments to the FAA on an Enhanced Payload
BASED
SPACE
MATTERS
(Sept.
16,
2016),
Review,
GROUND
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/09/16/comments-to-thefaa-on-an-enhanced-payload-review/#more-115 [https://perma.cc/QY9Y-3QVT]
(arguing “the proposed enhanced payload review fails to provide commercial
actors adequate notice as to what activity must obtain authorization”).
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very weak one, that only requires Congress to provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the Executive Branch or to exercise the essentials of the legislative function.239 Delegating to the Executive
Branch authority over activities that essentially require being
placed aboard the equivalent of an intercontinental ballistic missile
to engage in, and subjecting those activities to review based on a
limited set of factors—including national security and international
obligation compliance—seems to be narrower than many previously upheld delegations. For example, U.S. courts upheld the price
control delegations granted to President Nixon in the 1970’s that
potentially applied to the entire economy.240
Moreover, the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the famous
Curtiss-Wright case confirms that Congress can paint with a very
broad brush when delegating power in the foreign affairs and national security realms.241 The Supreme Court has not invalidated a
delegation in over eight decades.242 If Congress chooses to require
authorization for on-orbit activities generally, rather than a specific
list of activities, it will be upheld in any court challenge. Proponents of listing specific activities that require authorization also argue that failure to do so is like Congress delegating power to the
Executive Branch to authorize every activity in the State of Connecticut.243 The analogy collapses immediately based on federalism concerns present in one and not in the other. The Connecticut
hypothetical would have the federal government regulating in areas of traditional state competence. Federal regulation of on-orbit
activities does not intrude on traditional areas of state regulation.
The closer, although still imperfect, analogy is if Congress delegated authority to the Executive Branch to restrict travel of U.S. citi-

See, e.g., J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Am.,
AFL-CIO v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (approving delegation to the
President under a statute that provided the President is authorized to issue such
orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents,
wages, and salaries at a level not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970).
241 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
242 See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-Delegation Doctrine
BLOG
(Dec.
4,
2014),
Returns
after
Long
Hiatus,
SCOTUS
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegationdoctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus [https://perma.cc/4QC9-8ARL] (discussing
non-delegation doctrine being recently revisited).
243 See Laura Montgomery, supra note 105 (discussing application of the
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to the private sector).
239
240
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zens to, and their activities upon arrival in, other non-sovereignty
zones, such as the high seas or Antarctica. The federal government
could impose such restrictions on travel to ensure compliance with
international obligations or to protect U.S. national security.
Due process arguments for failure to list specific activities, and
thus, to provide proper notice to those potentially regulated, will
also fail. Those boarding or placing objects on board rockets intended for LEO or beyond have adequate notice that they need authorization involving a limited set of criteria under any of the proposed solutions to fill the regulatory gap. Policy reasons also
caution against specifically listing activities requiring authorization. The Administration’s report proposing a Mission Authorization Framework discussed the most likely activities to occur within
the near future—mining, on-orbit or lunar labs, facilities or hotels,
and on-orbit satellite servicing—and one could, in theory, simply
limit the framework to those activities. But doing so would come
with costs. It is often hard to predict which new technologies will
come to market first. There is always the unexpected idea that proceeds to market quicker than anticipated. Any activity not on the
list is disadvantaged, relative to listed activities, because it would
be subject to the exact same cloudy situation facing all on–orbit activities currently—one in which the Executive Branch may seek to
leverage its payload authority to prevent the activity, or alternatively may not, because it lacks authority. In either case, the nonlisted activity’s investors are in a difficult situation—if blocked,
they may be left with only a litigation option, and even if not
blocked, they may suffer ramifications due to questions over
whether the U.S. complied with its OST Art. VI obligations.
Remember that, in terms of international obligation compliance, much of what must be considered in an authorization and
supervision process are Art. IX’s non-interference and anticontamination obligations.244 Take a company that is considering a
lunar brewing facility—an idea not so far-fetched, it turns out.245
There is no way to say in advance whether the lunar brewing facility’s chosen location will interfere with the operations of another

Id. at 34-5.
See Henry Bodkin, Scientist Brewing Up Plan to Make Beer on the Moon, THE
TELEGRAPH
(Jan.
22,
2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/01/22/scientists-brewing-planmake-beer-moon [https://perma.cc/7V8X-YY7Q] (discussing a plan to find out
whether beer can be brewed on the Moon).
244
245
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entity—it all depends on the location chosen and the plans of the
business. It is for this reason that Chairman Babin’s idea for “blanket statutory authorizations for classes of activities”246 will also be
hard to implement. Many, if not all, space activities could be performed in a manner consistent or inconsistent with the OST—all
depending on the facts. For example, Congress has already made
clear that asteroid and space resource mining is an approved activity—so much so that Congress has essentially granted property
rights in extracted resources garnered from those activities. But
there is still a need for those activities to go through the “light
touch” authorization and supervision process to determine whether the chosen location of those activities harmfully interferes with
foreign space activities, or whether the rover and operations will
harmfully contaminate a celestial body. Of course, there may be
some “Earthly,” mundane activities taking place within research
labs or space hotels (i.e., in-facility activities) that may cause no
concern, such as teeth brushing. Congress could direct the authorizing agency to create a list of “in-facility” activities that are in essence pre-approved, recognizing that disposal of certain items
(such as toothbrushes) may still require review. Congress might
also seek to exclude these types of activities via definitions. For
example, the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill
excluded from its definition of space object “an article on board a
space object that is only intended for use inside a space object.”247
6.2.2. Relying on the Common Law of Torts or a Newly Created
Federal Statutory Cause of Action for Unreasonable Interference.
Using existing tort law,248 or even a newly created federal statutory cause of action, as a replacement for an authorization and supervision framework administered by the Executive Branch that
looks at U.S. international obligations—especially non-interference
obligations—creates several problems. First, authorization indicates that “official permission” is obtained, and the context of that
authorization suggests the U.S. must assure conformity with non-

See Babin, supra note 2.
American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 80101(11)(C)(i).
248 See id. at 5 (listing tort law as a possible solution to be considered).
246
247

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/4

2017]

Contours of Permissionless Innovation

181

interference obligations in Art. IX of the OST. Tort law solutions
do not meet the ordinary meaning of the word “authorize,” but rather attempt to remedy an actual case of harmful interference after
the fact. Further, tort law solutions in domestic courts, for actions
occurring in outer space, face several potential problems, including
difficulties in basing cases on trespass given the lack of surface or
sub-surface property rights, as well as difficulties in fact collection
in the outer space arena. Given the global nature of the aerospace
industry, other procedural barriers will limit the effectiveness of
relying on litigation to meet Art. IX obligations, such as obtaining
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, or enforcing U.S.
court judgments abroad, among others.249
The original July 2014 Asteroids Act bill (H.R. 5063) did seek to
create a non-interference right and a federal court action to enforce
the right. Specifically, it provided the following:
(b) FREEDOM FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
As between any entities over which the United States can
exercise jurisdiction, any assertion of superior right to execute specific commercial asteroid resource utilization activities in outer space shall prevail if it is found to be first in
time, derived upon a reasonable basis, and in accordance
with all existing international obligations of the United
States.
RELIEF FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
A United States commercial asteroid resource utilization
entity may bring an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief, or both, under this chapter for any action, by another private entity, compromising the right to conduct its
operations free of harmful interference.250
However, this federally-created non-interference action was
dropped from the final version of the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015.251 Having federal courts create rules for what constitutes unreasonable and harmful interference is not preferred to solutions negotiated between government

See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 256–62 (discussing the potential for litigation
by SFPs in foreign court).
250 Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. § 51302 (2014).
251 Pub. L. No. 114-90, supra note 178.
249
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and industry, or between the U.S. government and foreign governments, given the diplomatic and political sensitivities. Enforcement of any such judgments in foreign jurisdictions may also
face numerous hurdles,252 as well as if U.S. courts engage in a U.S.
centric-view of how to balance the competing principles of “free
access to all areas of celestial bodies” and the ban on surface or
sub-surface rights in Art. I and II of the OST on the one hand, with
the “due regard” and avoid “harmful interference” obligations of
Article IX on the other hand. It is better to leave judgments on
granular matters to the Executive Branch that can consult with and
negotiate with U.S. industry and foreign governments, free of
standards of proof and the evidentiary rules of a courtroom. Further, other countries might open their courts to similar actions
against U.S. entities, leading to parallel litigation and competing
judgments. Lastly, the Asteroids Act’s harmful interference action
would only have applied to foreign entities over which U.S. courts
could exercise personal jurisdiction,253 whereas the Executive
Branch negotiations and leverage can also be brought to bear with
respect to actors over which U.S. courts lack personal jurisdiction.
7. CONCLUSION
Permissionless innovation is rarely pure or unadulterated, but
rather, it is contextual. The space domain context necessitates ex
ante, case-by-case approval processes, if the U.S. is to comply with
its international obligations and ensure protection of national security. The current regulatory gap concerning new on-orbit activities
by commercial space entities appears to come close to a (nearly)
pure or unadulterated form that on its surface appears to avoid all
need for ex ante, or any other, review. Indeed, advocates of the
nearly pure form of permissionless innovation seek to ensure this
status quo by even ignoring the long-established, agreed-upon
rules of treaty interpretation that bind the U.S. government to argue that the U.S. does not need to authorize and supervise new onorbit activities to ensure compliance by commercial entities with

252 See generally Asteroids Act, supra note 250 (limiting the jurisdiction under
the act to “between any entities over which the United States can exercise
jurisdiction.”).
253 See id. at § 51303.
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OST obligations. But ironically, this nearly pure form of permissionless innovation fails to achieve the benefits of permissionless
innovation for the innovators.
If the regulatory gap continues, the Executive Branch will continue to face a Hobbesian choice: allow on-orbit activities without
review, and thus violate U.S. international obligations under the
Outer Space Treaty and risk failing to take account of national security concerns, or, alternatively, seek to leverage existing payload
review authority in a manner that is likely not true to Congressional intent to review and possibly block such activities where they
conflict with the OST or national security interests. Commercial
space businesses are in an equally poor situation: risking foreign
government retaliation in a variety of forms for engaging in activity that does not comply with the OST, or being faced with the prospect of costly and time-consuming litigation against the U.S. government, a substantial customer of commercial space services,
arguing that the Executive Branch exceeded its delegated powers.
Investment in new on-orbit activities will be chilled as a result of
this regulatory uncertainty.
Fortunately, Congress can enact a “light touch” regulatory solution that fills the gap—providing compliance with international
obligations, protection of national security, and regulatory certainty for U.S. space businesses—and at the same time ensures that
permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de corps controls the
interagency approval process. Congress can do so by adjusting the
three existing proposals to fill the gap—the Mission Authorization
framework proposed by the Obama White House’s OSTP, the Enhanced Payload Review process proposed by Rep. Bridenstine in
the Space Renaissance Act bill, and the Certification Process proposed by the House Science Committee’s American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act—to comport fully with the eight core
features recommended in this article. These core features include:
creating a default presumption in favor of approval, but without a
deemed authorized provision; limiting (but not too narrowly) the
factors that can be considered by the Executive Branch; enhancing
the default presumption by explicitly declaring that U.S. leadership
in specific new activities being contemplated is in the national security interest; granting lead interagency status to an agency directed to promote industry and experienced in licensing and administering an interagency process; establishing deadlines with
notification and reporting requirements to Congress; establishing
an ombuds and/or appeal avenues to the President or Vice-
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President-led Space Council in cases of denial of approval; limiting
chances for regulatory arbitrage and possible “flags of convenience,” to help ensure innovation occurs in United States; and having the U.S. government encourage and give substantial deference
to industry standards. An ex ante licensing process with features
that ensure a default in favor of approval, along with timely,
transparent, and appealable decisions, with deference to industry
standards, fits comfortably within a permissionless innovation line
of thinking.
However, two suggested amendments to the existing proposed
approaches should be avoided: first, listing specific activities that
require authorization or giving blanket statutory authorizations to
certain activities, and, second, relying on the common law of torts
or a newly created federal statutory cause of action to prevent
harmful interference. The first is not mandated by Constitutional
requirements and actually preserves the cloudy situation for nonlisted activities. The latter places decisions in non-expert hands
without the benefit of negotiation by the Executive Branch with
foreign countries and with the industry over what should constitute harmful interference.
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